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Breaking the Cycle of Despair:
Street Children in Guatemala City
by Tamara Rice Lave*
On March 4, 1990, a group of children sat inhaling glue from
plastic bags near the Klee Pharmacy in Zone 1 of Guatemala
City. It was late, and they were cold and hungry. Street
children who either had no families or had left them to
escape abuse, they used the glue to dull their physical and
emotional pain.
Sometime after midnight, five uniformed police
officers approached the children. Four of them yelled insults
and poured glue into the children's hair. The only one who
protested, Nahaman Carmona Lopez, was kicked into a state
of unconsciousness by the four policemen. He died in the
hospital eleven days later. Nahaman was only thirteen years
old.*
Though extreme, Nahaman's case is not uncommon. Most
street children flee abuses of the home only to confront cruelty on the
street.' With no adult role models, they group together, often stealing
to buy food and sniffing glue to comfort themselves.2 The problem is
serious enough to attract the attention of both the national and
* B.A., Haverford College (1990); J.D., Stanford Law School (1995). I would like
to thank John Barton, Terry Karl, Kathleen Morrison, Sophie Pirie, and Jane Depledge
for their insightful comments and criticism. I would also like to thank Bruce Harris and
everyone else at Casa Alianza, without whom I would not have been exposed to street
children and their problems. This Article was made possible by the generous support of
the Latin American Studies Center at Stanford University and the Mellon Foundation.
** Casa Alianza, the Latin American branch of Covenant House, has been
aggressive in fighting for the rights of street children. In 1990, Casa Alianza initiated
proceedings against Nahaman's killers. In 1992, after legal obstacles, delayed
proceedings, overturned decisions, and death threats, Casa Alianza won a landmark case.
The four policemen were fined 5000 quetzals each (about U.S. $1000) and sent to jail for
twelve years. It was the second time in Guatemala's history that police were convicted
of committing human rights abuses. See Casa Alianza, 1991 Annual Report (Abuses
Against the Street Children of Guatemala in 1991: A Joint Report by the Legal Aid
Office for Street Children of Casa Alianza (Covenant House) Guatemala and the Youth
Procurator of the Public Ministry of Guatemala) 3 (1992); Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual
Report 10 (1993).
1. Street Children: A Global Disgrace: Hearing Before the Select Committee on
Hunger, House of Representatives, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1991) [hereinafter Street
Children] (statement of Carlos Palacios, former street child currently working with
Childhope in Guatemala).
2. Id. at 5.
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international communities.' The hard question is what to do.
This Article focuses on the problem of street children in
Guatemala City.4 It provides a description of the way street children
live and offers several theories as to why the situation arose. Finally,
the Article critically discusses attempts to help the street children of
Guatemala and proposes alternative solutions.
I. STREET CHILDREN IN GUATEMALA
It is important to begin by defining "street children." In the
past, scholars lumped all children who spent extended time on the
street under the term "street children." They made no distinction
between children who worked on the streets and children who slept on
the streets.5 Recently however, researchers and child advocates have
acknowledged this distinction. UNICEF, for example, labels children
who work during the day and return to their parents at night "children
on the streets." "Children of the streets," in contrast, are those children
who work and live on the streets while maintaining some bonds with
their families but who essentially live self-sufficiently.6 Abandoned
children are those who have absolutely no ties with their families.'
Childhope Foundation, an organization that works with street children
3. Id. (statement of Hon. Tony P. Hall, Representative from Ohio); Lori Lease,
Killing the Children of the Third World, Wash. Post, Outlook, Apr. 21, 1991, reprinted
in Street Children, supra note 1, at 76.
4. For information on street children in other countries, see generally Susanna
Agnelli et al., Street Children: A Growing Urban Tragedy (1986) (discussing street
children generally); Francisco Espert & William Myers, UNICEF, Situation Analysis:
Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances, 1988-1991 (1991) (discussing street
children generally); Basilica Espinola et aL, In the Streets: Working With Street
Children in Asunci6n (1987) (discussing street children in Paraguay); Jill Swart,
Malunde: The Street Children of Hillbrow (1990) (discussing street children in South
Africa); Gilberto Dimenstein, Brazil: War on Children (1991); La Accion del Cisol con los
Niflos Trabajadores en la Ciudad de Loja, Documento Evaluativo para Unicef (1989)
(discussing street children in Ecuador); Susana Zucchetti Canevaro, Los Nifios en la
Calle: Experiencia de Trabajo en Lima, Peri (1990) (discussing street children in Peru);
Fabio Dallape, "You Are a Thief": An Experience With Street Children (1987) (discussing
street children in Kenya); Peter Tagon, Survey on Street Children in Three Urban
Centres of Namibia (1991) (discussing street children in Namibia).
5. Gary Barker & Felicia Knaul, Exploited Entrepreneurs: Street and Working
Children in Developing Countries 2 (Childhope-USA, Inc. Working Paper No. 1, 1991).
6. Id. (citing Executive Board, UNICEF, Exploitation of Working Children and
Street Children (1986)).
7. Id.
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in cities throughout the Third World,' labels all of these children
"street children" and estimates that of all the street children in the
world, 75% are children on the street, 20% are children of the street,
and 5% are truly abandoned.9 For the purposes of this Article, the
term "street children" refers to those children who are either of the
street or truly abandoned.
A. Estimated Number of Street Children
Estimates of the number of street children vary
considerably. 0 Jorge Amardo Calderon" estimates that there are
5000 street children in Guatemala, of whom 800 live in the capital.
Casa Alianza, an orphanage that advocates for the rights of street
children, places the number in the capital at about 3500.12 The U.S.
House of Representatives, Select Committee on Hunger, published a
fact sheet in late 1991 stating that 5000 children live on the streets of
Guatemala City and 1.4 million children work on those streets.1
3
Marilyn Rocky, National Director of Childhope-USA, a
subsidiary of Childhope Foundation, estimates that unless something
is done, the number of street children will double by the year 2010.'
B. Lifestyle
1. Appearance
Most street children are quite young. According to a report by
Childhope, the average age of street children is 11.6 years old. The
average age of boys is 12.3 years old, and the average age of girls is
8. Street Children, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
9. Barker & Knaul, supra note 5, at 2.
10. Id. This should not come as a surprise. Compiling statistics in Guatemala is
difficult for a variety of reasons, including the fact that many Guatemalans do not speak
Spanish. In addition, as pointed out above, what one study may call a street child,
another may not. This is mentioned now so that the reader can treat all of the statistics
in this paper as approximations, and not as exact measurements.
11. Interview with Jorge Amardo Calderon, Chief of the Minors Section of the
National Police of Guatemala, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Aug. 1993).
12. Memorandum from Marvin Rabanales Garcia, Casa Alianza staff (Aug. 26,
1993) (on file with author).
13. Street Children, supra note 1, at 53-54.
14. Id. at 7 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional Director, Childhope-USA).
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10.3 years old.15
My personal observations" indicated that street children have
varied appearances. Many of the younger boys are shabbily dressed.
Their clothes usually are too big, and they do not have sweaters or
jackets for the night, which gets cold. If they have shoes, they are
usually ripped with the laces missing. Their hair is often extremely
short, not for fashion, but because civilians or members of the
Guatemalan security forces commonly pour glue on their heads,
leaving them with no choice but to shave off their hair. As boys get
older, however, they tend to dress better. They wear nice shoes and
more fashionable clothing. Some wear gold chains or other jewelry.
From a young age, girls tend to care more about how they look.
Many wear make-up and skirts or dresses. They often wear some kind
of feminine shoes. Of course not all girls fit the Latin image; some
wear jeans and sneakers.
2. Physical Health
Not surprisingly, street children suffer from a variety of health
problems. The most prevalent sicknesses are skin problems, respiratory
disease, dental problems, and gastro-intestinal problems. Many of the
abandoned children suffer from trauma or sexually-transmitted
diseases. 7
No statistics exist on how much street children eat in
Guatemala, but street educators from Casa Alianza estimate that few
eat more than once a day.'" In the neighboring country of Honduras,
data was collected by Project Alternatives, a program for street
children in the capital city of Tegucigalpa. The study showed that 7.2%
of street children eat one meal per day, 36% eat two, and 56% eat
15. El Drama de los Nilos de la Calle, Siglo Veintuno, July 24, 1993, at 2.
16. The information here and in the following paragraph came from personal
observation and conversations with Casa Alianza street educators, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (Summer 1993).
17. Street Children, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Dr. Donald Kaminsky,
Executive Director, Project Alternatives).
18. The street educators form the bedrock of Casa Alianza's outreach program.
They go out on the street with basic medical supplies and treat minor injuries. For more
serious injuries, the street educators take the children to a Casa Alianza nurse and, if
necessary, to the hospital. By visiting the children every day, Casa Alianza hopes that
the street educators will gain the trust of the children so that they eventually may leave
the streets to enter one of Casa Alianza's crisis centers.
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three. 9 In addition, these Honduran children suffer from chronic
malnutrition, and only 20% reach a normal height for their age.2'
Whether the numbers are lower or higher in Guatemala, street
children there certainly look unhealthy. They are extremely small for
their age, and the boys appear sexually underdeveloped. The boys have
no facial hair, their voices have not deepened, and they have little
muscle. It is easy to mistake a youth of sixteen for a child of eight.21
Many of the children, both boys and girls, have cuts and scars.
Some have carved the names of friends or lovers on their arms. Others
have scars from street fights. Since most do not have access to proper
medical care, cuts that could have healed easily are jagged and
infected. I met one boy who had been smashed in the face with a
bottle. Since he never received stitches, his wounds healed so that now
he can barely open one of his eyes. Other children limp from
improperly healed broken bones. A former nurse at Casa Alianza said
that he had seen street children with broken legs take off their casts
after only two weeks.22
Sexually-transmitted diseases (STDs) also pose a serious health
problem. A 1991 study of 143 Guatemalan street children conducted by
the Center of Orientation, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases and Casa Alianza found that 93% of those
studied admitted to having STDs. Of these, 78.3% admitted to having
genital herpes, 46.64% gonorrhea, 27.3% papillomatosis, 13.29%
vaginal trichomoniasis, 11.7% chancroids, and 69.9% scabies. This
same study found that none of the children reported using condoms.'
19. Street Children, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Dr. Donald Kaminsky,
Executive Director, Project Alternatives).
20. Id. at 21.
21. The information here and in the following paragraph is based on my personal
observations.
22. Interview with Hector Dionicio Godinez, Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (July 1993).
23. Center of Orientation, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Sexually Transmitted
Diseases (1991) [hereinafter Joint Study] (summary of study on file with author).
24. Id. The study also found that 70% of the children had one to two partners a
day, 4.2% had three to four partners, and 25.1% (92.31% girls) had more than four
partners per day. Id.
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3. Supporting Themselves
To make money, many of the younger children beg. Some
experts argue that a natural transition occurs from begging to
stealing.' The younger the child, the easier it is to arouse sympathy
and collect money. When a child gets older, however, begging no longer
offers a viable form of income and he or she must turn to something
else. Many, especially boys, resort to stealing such items as wallets,
sunglasses, and jewelry.
28
Other street children work, helping bus drivers collect money,
shining shoes, or dressing up as clowns and performing. Although some
girls earn money by cleaning or doing odd jobs, many are prostitutes.
Many work out of El Hoyo ("The Hole") in Zone 4 or in brothels in Zone
1.27 Since girls usually are unskilled and uneducated, prostitution is
one of the only livelihoods available to them. I saw no boy prostitutes
in Guatemala, and I was told by Casa Alianza street educators that
there were few.
4. Living Conditions
Carlos Palacios, a former street child in Bogotd, Colombia and
now a street educator with Childhope in Guatemala, said the children
live in places where they can "steal, beg and also disappear
quickly."2 For example, many ten-to-fifteen-year-old children live in
El Hoyo, a dirty, polluted, high-crime area around the bus terminal in
Zone 4. Some children come to El Hoyo because of its reputation as a
high-crime area with few policemen.' Others were born there, the
children of local prostitutes.'
25. Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Daniel Hoffman, Kids out of Place, XXVII North
American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas, No. 6, at 16, 20
[hereinafter NACLA Report].
26. This information was gathered through conversations with street children,
Casa Alianza street educators, and Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala
(Summer 1993).
27. This was stated by Casa Alianza street educators and members of the Casa
Alianza Legal Aid Office, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (July 1993).
28. Street Children, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Carlos Palacios).
29. Interview with Wellington Tello, Casa Alianza street educator, in Guatemala
City, Guatemala (July 1993).
30. Id.
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In El Hoyo, many children sleep indoors.3" They buy small
bags of glue, priced between 50 centavos and one quetzal (about 10-20
U.S. cents), that keep them high for about an hour. In exchange for
buying glue, they are allowed to sleep on the floor of a bar or house of
prostitution. Sometimes they exchange stolen goods for a few nights of
shelter.
Not all children sleep inside, however. I went to El Hoyo one
night with a group of street educators from Casa Alianza. We saw a
group of young boys sleeping together. Some were huddled under a
blanket, others under a cardboard box, and still others under nothing
at all.
Another set of boys, between the ages of ten and eighteen,
spends its days at Concordia Park, across the street from the National
Police Palace. The boys hang out most of the time next to the public
bathrooms, inhaling glue and listening to the salsa and rap cassettes
that blast from the vendors in the park. At night, they sleep under a
nylon/plastic shelter at the corner of 18th Street and 6th Avenue.
Another group sleeps in the Central Park but spends most of
its time in Trebol, a dirty, polluted area where buses stop on the way
to Antigua. These children were characterized by Casa Alianza street
educator Wellington Tello as older and more aggressive. They are
between twelve and eighteen years of age and have often experienced
severe family abuse and torture. Many have been beaten by people on
the street.
The promise of shelter attracts some to Jocotales, an extremely
poor neighborhood in Zone 6. There, the children can sleep in or under
parked buses. The children in Jocotales range in age from eleven to
nineteen and generally have quite serious addictions to glue and other
drugs.
The oldest children sleep in the "hotels," a cluster of cheap,
dirty hotels in Zone 1 that charge about two dollars a night. Many of
the girls who live in the hotels have babies or small children. They
often sleep two to a room. The girls share their beds with their babies,
and sometimes with a customer. According to street educator
Wellington Tello, once children get older, they start to look and act
differently. Most become more conscious of the way they dress and
become more discreet about their drug addiction. They often form more
31. Unless otherwise indicated, the information here and in the remaining
paragraphs of this section came from personal observation and interviews with Casa
Alianza staff members, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
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serious relationships at this point, and some even get married.
Yet not all street children have broken their familial ties.
Marilyn Rocky of Childhope estimates that only 5% of street children
in Central America are truly abandoned or completely disconnected
from their families. 2 Some sleep at home but spend their waking
hours on the streets. Others go home when they have an emergency.
One night, fourteen-year-old Justo got kicked in the head while he was
sleeping. When he began to feel nauseous and could not eat, he went
home. His ear drum had exploded from the blow.33
5. Drugs
An estimated 90% of Guatemalan street children are dependent
on glue, paint thinner or other more powerful drugs such as
pharmaceutical pills, beer, rum and rubbing alcohol.' The
majority inhale shoe glue, which they pour into plastic bags. Others
breathe it straight from the bottle. Five quetzals will buy a bottle of
glue big enough to keep a child high for about six hours. Paint thinner
is also popular; children pour it onto rags and sniff.3
Many children try to hide their drug problem by covering their
32. Street Children, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
33. I was with street educator Cristina Neffwhen some street children told us that
Justo was dizzy and nauseous because of a head injury and had returned to his home.
Cristina and I went to his neighborhood and found Justo in serious pain. He came with
us to see the nurse at the refugio, or boys' crisis center, before being told that his injury
was of such severity that a hospital visit was required. Cristina visited Justo in the
hospital and said he was excited to receive candy and games to play. Although Justo
tried hard to stay in the refugio, he left because he was unable to get over his addiction
to glue. The last time I saw Justo was in front of a bus in Jocotales in early August 1993.
We talked about his glue problem and I offered to give him my baseball hat if he quit.
Justo was unable to accept my offer, and as far as I know, he is still in Jocotales.
34. In Guatemala, one does not need a prescription to get pharmaceutical drugs.
Thus, barbiturates like valium are available over the counter.
35. Substance Abuse: International Experts Focus on Street Children, AIDS Weekly,
May 9, 1994 [hereinafter Substance Abuse].
36. A 1991 study of 143 Guatemalan street children performed by Casa Alianza
and the Center of Orientation, Diagnosis and Treatment of Sexually Transmitted
Diseases found that 100% used inhalants (like shoe glue). The study also found that
96.5% use drugs daily and that 3.5% use them weekly. See Joint Study, supra note 23
and accompanying text.
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bags or bottles with clothing.37 Some children have adopted this
behavior as a way of avoiding harassment from the police and private
citizens. Others are ashamed. This was evidenced by the fact that some
street children hid their glue inside of their shirts or jackets when they
were around the street educators. Since these street children knew
that the street educators would not hurt them and that they would be
given basic first aid and coloring books regardless of whether they
inhaled glue, their behavior was more easy to explain as shame.
Further, some of them talked of their plans to quit inhaling glue.
It would be a mistake to blame drug use for causing children
to live on the streets; drugs constitute only part of the problem. A
study in Sgio Paulo, Brazil showed that the worse a child's relations
were with his family and school, the more likely he or she was to use
drugs.38 My experience in Guatemala suggested that mistreatment
and feelings of alienation drive children out of the home, and it is later
on the street that they first try glue. Once they start, it is very difficult
to stop. Glue and paint thinner are more physically addictive than
cocaine or alcohol because they become part of a child's blood tissue.3 9
In addition, many of the children are psychologically hooked to the
feeling of euphoria that inhalants provide.40 They rely on drugs to
dull their feelings of hunger, cold, isolation, and rejection.
4 1
Not only does addiction make it more difficult to leave the
streets, but glue also has serious health consequences. In the short
term, inhaling industrial glue results in lightheadedness, nausea, and
loss of appetite. The long-term effects are much more extreme; inhaling
glue has been linked to irreversible brain and kidney damage, lung
damage, malnourishment, and a general decline in health.42
37. The information in this paragraph came from personal observation and
interviews with Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
38. Dimenstein, supra note 4, at 3.
39. Telephone interview with Willard Goode, certified addiction specialist and
hotline coordinator at Washington Area Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (Oct. 27,
1995).
40. Id.; interviews with street children and Casa Alianza street educators and
staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
41. I learned this through interviews with street children and discussions with
Casa Alianza street educators and staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
42. See Street Children, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA); see also Substance Abuse, supra note 35.
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6. Mistreatment
Considered outcasts by Guatemalan society, street children
often suffer severe mistreatment by both civilians and the police or
army.' It is common practice for police to pour glue in the children's
hair and sometimes force them to drink it. Other children are yelled
at or threatened. Some are refused service in restaurants or at food
stalls. They are either ignored, stared at, or forced to leave.
But there are also much more serious cases of abuse. Children
are beaten by family members, friends, and strangers." They are
kidnapped, tortured, and even killed.45 Sexual abuse and rape afflict
both boys and girls.46 Exact numbers are hard to find. The police do
not keep careful statistics, nor do other private or public
organizations.47 The only organization that keeps systematic data is
43. I learned this through interviews with street children and discussions with
street educators and other Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer
1993).
44. Id.; see Street Children, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Marilyn Rocky,
Regional Director, Childhope-USA).
45. Street Children, supra note 1, at 6.
46. In the 1991 study of 143 street children by Casa Alianza and the Center of
Orientation, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Joint Study,
supra note 23, it was found that 100% of the children interviewed had been abused
sexually. Of these, 53% were abused by family members, 5.95% by friends, 2.7% by
neighbors, and 46% by strangers.
The study also found that 64.1% of the girls stated that their first sexual
relationship was with their mother or father, 10.2% stated that it was with an uncle or
aunt, 10.2% with a sibling, 2.6% with a friend, 5.1% with a boyfriend or girlfriend, and
7.7% other. Id.
Of the boys interviewed, 7.7% stated that their first sexual relationship was
with a parent, 22.1% with an aunt or uncle, 5.7% with a sibling, 6.7% with a friend, and
51.9% other. None stated that their first sexual relationship had been with a girlfriend
or boyfriend. Id.
In her testimony before the House Committee on Hunger, Marilyn Rocky
described a recent study in Guatemala in which 38 street girls were interviewed and
asked questions about their sexuality. The study found that 95% of these girls reported
having been sexually abused and 55% stated that they had been pregnant at least once.
Street Children, supra note 1, at 39.
47. The police do not compile exact statistics. Those provided by Jorge Amardo
Calderon, Head of the Minors Section at the National Police, recorded only the number
of complaints the police had received from Casa Alianza. The complaints were not broken
down by type of abuse nor by the years in which they occurred. Officer Calderon's
explanation for the crudeness of the numbers was that his office was overworked because
it was also the Office for Disappeared Persons. Interview with Jorge Amardo Calderon,
in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Aug. 1993).
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Casa Alianza, and it did not begin documenting abuses until 1990."B
Taking the average number of abuses against street children that
occurred in Guatemala City that were reported to Casa Alianza
between 1990 and 1994: in 1990, the number of recorded abuses was
41% below the average; in 1991, 20% below the average; in 1992, 49%
above the average; in 1993, 28% above the average; and in 1994, 30%
above the average.49
While these numbers look low, they must be used cautiously.
The Legal Aid Office compiles Casa Alianza's statistics; unfortunately,
however, many incidents of abuse are never brought to the office's
attention. ° I believe that children's reluctance to report violence
stems from several sources. Some children may not have enough
concrete information, like a badge or license number, to make giving
a report worthwhile. Others may not want to go through lengthy legal
proceedings. Still others may be afraid. Fear of retaliation from the
police or army may thwart any desire they might have to make an
official complaint.
C. What Brings Them to the Streets
To understand what brings children to the streets, it is first
necessary to look more generally at some of the problems afflicting
Guatemala. The most critical problems are poverty, high birth rate,
land distribution, government and military repression, urbanization,
lack of education, lack of economic opportunity, child labor, and lack
of unions."
1. Poverty
Based on indices of income distribution and public services, the
United Nations called Guatemala among the four worst countries in
48. Crimes recorded by Casa Alianza include the following: abuses of authority,
illegal detentions, murders, physical attacks resulting in injury, threats, intimidation,
rapes, and kidnappings. In 1990, there were 22 recorded abuses against street children;
in 1991, 30; in 1992, 56; in 1993, 31; in 1994, 49.
49. Casa Alianza statistics (on file with author).
50. See Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note **, at 2.
51. Street Children, supra note 1, at 6-7 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
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the world." Ironically, Guatemala has a gross per capita product
more like that of median developing countries." In Guatemala, a
minute section of the population is extraordinarily rich, and most of
the rest are extremely poor.'
Eighty percent of Guatemalan families live in poverty"5 and
5.1 million of Guatemala's population of ten million were deemed by
the Guatemalan Attorney for Human Rights to be living in subhuman
conditions." The Central American Council for Housing called
Guatemala the country with the worst housing situation in Central
America.57 Fifty percent of the population lack minimal quarters; 62%
of the population have only dirt floors; and more than 50% of families
have only one room for the entire family.' In addition, over half of
the existing housing do not have water supply services, and 63%
percent do not have latrines.6s
Health also constitutes a serious problem in Guatemala.
Government health programs cover only 14% of the population," and
most people cannot afford to go to a private hospital.61 Even if they
have access to a public hospital or clinic, people still are not
guaranteed help. Waiting lines are long, and it is not uncommon for
public hospitals to run out of medicine for weeks at a time.6
52. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Fourth Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Guatemala 5, U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.2/V/ll.83 (1993) [hereinafter Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights]. For a more detailed examination of poverty
in Guatemala, see Appendix A.
53. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 5 (quoting
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1993,
at 135-36 (1993)).
54. America's Watch, Human Rights in Guatemala: No Neutrals Allowed 1 (1982)
[hereinafter Neutrals].
55. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 8.
56. Id. at 8 (quoting Attorney for Human Rights, Los Derechos Humanos: un




60. Id. at 5 (citing Carmelo Mesa Lago, Aspectos Economicos Financieros para la
Seguridad Social en America Latina y el Caribe, in ECLAD Equidad y Transformacion
Productiva (1992)); SEGEPLAN & UNICEF, Analysis of Situation of Women and
Children (1991).
61. This information was obtained through personal interviews with locals in
Guatemala from July 1990 to August 1991. Further conversations with Guatemalans
in the summer of 1993 confirmed this observation.
62. During the year in which I lived in Guatemala, the public hospitals frequently
lacked medicine.
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Because of the poor living standards and lack of medical care,
many people suffer. Infant mortality is at 6%,' with the major causes
of death being diarrheic diseases, acute respiratory infections, and
malnutrition.6 Cholera has also been a major killer in Guatemala.'
In 1992 alone, there were almost 15,000 cases.'
Malnutrition is another serious problem in Guatemala. In 1987,
33.5% of the population suffered from malnutrition, and of these,
57.8% suffered from chronic malnutrition.67 Of children between five
and nine who attend school, 37% suffer from malnutrition.
68
2. High Birth Rate
Guatemalan women have an average of 6.4 live births.
69
According to the National Family Planning Center, the 1990
population of 9.2 million will quadruple to 34.3 million in the first
quarter of the 21st century.70 Such a dramatic birth rate only
exacerbates the plight of Guatemala's poor, making it harder for
parents to support their growing families and, thus, more likely that
children will be forced to go out into the streets and work.71
63. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993:
Investing in Health: World Development Indicators, Table 28 (Health and Nutrition), at
292 (1993).
64. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 8 (citing
official Pan American Health Organization, Health Conditions in Latin America (1990)).
65. Cholera is an acute intestinal disease that can cause death within a few hours
from onset if not treated properly. It is usually transmitted through food or water that
has been contaminated with feces or vomitus. The incubation period lasts between a few
hours and five days. It is prevalent in areas that do not have clean drinking water (or
the ability to sterilize it) and do not have the ability to disinfect or heat up food.
Ironically, treatment of cholera is relatively easy. The afflicted must drink or receive
intravenously a solution comprised primarily of water, sugar, and salt. American Public
Health Association, California State Department of Health Services, Control of
Communicable Diseases in California 105-10 (1983).
66. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 8.
67. Id. at 5 (citing Pan American Health Organization, Health Conditions in Latin
America, Washington, D.C. (1990)).
68. Id. at 8.
69. David Stoll, Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala 15 (1993)
(citing Jorge Arias de Blois, Cronica, Oct. 6, 1989, at 15).
70. Id.
71. See Barker & Knaul, supra note 5, at 6-7.
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3. Land Distribution
Although Guatemala has fertile land, people are severely
malnourished.72 In part, this is because of disparities in land
ownership. Currently, 2.1% of the farm property owners possess 72%
of the farmland and receive 90% of the farm credit.7" This land is
divided into huge plantations worked by predominantly indigenous
labor at extremely low wages.74 Although it would be possible to use
this land to grow low cost, nutritious foods, such as corn and beans,
most plantation owners do not.75 Instead, they devote the land to
export crops, such as coffee, bananas, and pineapples.76 Only food
that is of a quality too low to export appears in the local markets.7
Those who are lucky enough to own land often do not have
enough to sustain themselves. 78 There are 548,000 small farms in
Guatemala, with an average size of 4.6 acres.79 These farms receive
only 4% of the farm credit.' Consequently, significant numbers of
people are forced to leave their land to work as seasonal laborers on
coffee or sugar plantations. 81 For the past several years, however,
plantations have been swarmed with people seeking work, making it
harder for people to make the money they need to survive.8 2 The lack
of opportunity drives many people into the cities in search of jobs to
72. Telephone interview with Rachel Garst, Assistant for Guatemala, Washington
Office on Latin America (Oct. 24, 1995). See also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying
text.
73. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 6.




78. A 1980 USAID study concluded that 90% of people are living on land that is
too small to give them income sufficient to support themselves. Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Abandoning the Victims: The UN Advisory Services Program in
Guatemala 21 (1990) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee for Human Rights] (citing U.S.
Agency for International Development, Land and Labor in Guatemala (1982)).
79. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 6.
80. Id.
81. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 21. Jean-Marie
Simon, Eternal Spring-Eternal Tyranny 25-26 (1987); Donald T. Fox, Human Rights
in Guatemala 18 (n.d.) (report of a mission to Guatemala in June 1979 on behalf of the
International Commission of Jurists).
82. Telephone interview with Victoria Rich, Guatemala Human Rights Commission
(Nov. 20, 1995).
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support themselves.'
The cause for this disparity is multifold, but the simplest
answer is greed. As in the rest of the Americas, Europeans have taken
large chunks of land from the indigenous people.8 When private
landowners have wanted more land, they have simply taken it. as
Even if those farming the land have been there for many generations,
their claims are not honored. If they protest their eviction, indigenous
people are in danger of being killed."
4. Government and Military Repression
Another important factor in explaining how children get on the
street is military repression. For the last thirty years, Guatemala has
been in a state of civil war. In an effort to free themselves from an
oppressive economic and political situation, Guatemalan guerrillas
have fought for revolution.87 The army and other paramilitary forces
have responded brutally.' Anyone suspected of being or aiding a
guerrilla has been at risk of being "disappeared"89 or killed. Between
1966 and 1986, 100,000 civilians were killed and 38,000
disappeared. 9' Politicians, priests, journalists, human rights workers,
83. Id.
84. Fox, supra note 81, at 2.
85. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 22; see also Neutrals,
supra note 54, at 10.
86. Neutrals, supra note 54, at 10.
87. Telephone interview with Francisco Ortega Lopez, Representative to
Washington of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UNRG) (Nov. 20,
1995). The UNRG is the major guerilla organization in Guatemala. The four existing
Guatemalan insurgency groups united to form the UNRG in 1982. See Simon, supra note
81, at 80.
88. Americas Watch, Little Hope: Human Rights in Guatemala January 1984 to
January 1985, at 19-20 [hereinafter Little Hope].
89. The term "desaparecido," meaning "disappeared," originated in Guatemala. As
Jean-Marie Simon states, "[tihe term desaparecido ... acquired its grammatical
versatility as both a verb and participle (to be disappeared,' 'he was disappeared') in
Guatemala almost a decade before the term was exported to Chile and Argentina. As a
result, there is hardly a Guatemalan alive who cannot name at least a dozen friends,
relatives or colleagues killed or 'disappeared' over the past decade." Simon, supra note
81, at 14.
90. Americas Watch, Closing the Space: Human Rights in Guatemala May
1987-October 1988, at 5 (1988) (quoting Brook Larmer, Guatemala's Moderate Chief
Went Too Far for Far Right, Christian Sci. Mon., May 17, 1988).
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teachers, trade unionists, and peasants were often targeted.91
Hundreds of victims, sometimes still alive, were dropped into the
crater of Pacaya, Guatemala's most famous active volcano.9
Over 400 towns and villages have been razed in an effort to rid
Guatemala of leftist tendencies.93 One million people were
displaced.' Some fled the country or went into hiding. 5 Others
moved to different rural communities, model villages,' or Guatemala
City.
9 7
This regime of violence has affected children in particular.
Experts estimate that 45,000 to 60,000 parents were killed between
1978 and 1985, leaving 50,000 widows and 150,000 orphans.98
Additionally, the violence has had profound psychological
consequences. Prolonged exposure to violence results in serious
psychological problems, including "psychic numbing, social withdrawal,
an inability to concentrate, thought disorders, nightmares, night
terrors, [and] aggressive behaviors." 9  With intervention, these
children have a chance of recovering.1 °°
91. See Larry Towell, House on Ninth Street 12 (1994); see also Simon, supra note
81, at 15; Little Hope, supra note 88, at 5-18.
92. Simon, supra note 81, at 13.
93. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 75. See
generally Amnesty International, Guatemala: The Human Rights Record 53 (1987); see
also Beatriz Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War- The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in
Guatemala 83-89, 140-41 (1988).
94. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 63.
95. By 1984, an estimated 150,000 people had fled to Mexico. Even there, however,
they were not safe. On several occasions, they were attacked by the Guatemalan
military. Little Hope, supra note 88, at 31-32.
96. Model villages were constructed to house refugees and to allow the military to
prevent the influx of subversives into rural peasant communities. See Simon, supra note
81, at 154-55, 235-36.
97. Victor Perera, Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy 17-18 (1993).
98. Id. at 6 (quoting Chris Kruger & Kjell Enge, Washington Office on Latin
America, Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands 2 (Aug.
1985)).
99. Children of War: Victims of Conflict and Dislocation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 [hereinafter Children of War] (prepared
statement of Neil Boothby); see also Perera, supra note 97, at 95-101 (statement of
Adrianne Aron, Ph.D).
100. Children of War, supra note 99, at 51-52.
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5. Urbanization
Rapid urbanization is one of the primary causes of the street
child phenomenon. Currently, 40% of all Guatemalans live in cities,
and the average annual growth rate of urban areas between 1980 and
1991 was 3.5%.1o When people leave rural areas for the cities, they
most likely will settle in extremely poor neighborhoods; some estimate
that within twenty years, more than half of the population in
developing countries will be living in urban slums. °2 In addition,
families who immigrate to cities are less likely to have a social
network of extended family or friends on which they can depend.0 3
Many children are forced to go onto the streets in order to contribute
money to their families' paltry income.'O' Under the poverty and
pressure of urban life, the family unit begins to disintegrate.
10 5
6. Lack of Education
Illiteracy is a serious problem in Guatemala. Next to Haiti,
Guatemala has the highest illiteracy rate in Central America and the
Caribbean. In 1990, 45% of people over the age of fifteen could not
read or write.1°6
Sadly, it does not look as though the situation will improve. In
1980, only 58% of children between the ages of six and eleven attended
school.'0 v Recent statistics show no improvement.108  Of the
children who started elementary school in 1978, 63% had dropped out
by 1984, and in rural areas the number was 85%.109 Girls are worse
off than boys. Only 49% of girls living in rural areas enroll in
101. United Nations Development Programme, supra note 63, Table 31
(Urbanization), at 298.
102. Street Children, supra note 1, at 53 (U.S. House of Representatives, Fact Sheet
on Street Children).
103. See id. at 7 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional Director, Childhope-USA);
Agnelli, supra note 4, at 52-53.
104. See Street Children, supra note 1, at 84 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA); Agnelli, supra note 4, at 52-53.
105. See Street Children, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
106. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 6.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9.
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elementary school, and few graduate.11 ° Despite these problems, in
1985, only 1.8% of Guatemala's Gross Domestic Product was devoted
to education."'
7. Lack of Economic Opportunity
Even worse than the poverty is the seeming impossibility of the
poor to overcome it. In 1990, the unemployment rate was 41%, up from
31.2% in 1980.112
The majority of the population works at dismal salaries. A
minimum wage was introduced in 1973, but it covered only permanent
workers." The wage was set at 1.2 quetzals per day, which at the
time was equivalent to U.S. $1.20.114 In 1982, sugar and cotton
workers went on strike to bring the wage up to 3.2 quetzals per day.
This was unenforced, and the official wage was only 2.3 quetzals per
day. 115
In 1991, the minimum wage was increased by 78.5%.116
Consequently, the minimum wage of farm workers was raised to 11.60
quetzals (U.S. $2.00) per day, including a mandatory bonus.117
Similarly, the minimum wage of industrial workers was raised to 14
quetzals (U.S. $2.42) for an eight-hour work day," 8 with a required
hourly bonus. 19 Despite this significant increase, approximately 70%
of those employed live below the Guatemalan poverty line. 20
The situation is particularly bad for female workers. Although
the Guatemalan Constitution states the principle of gender equality,
women are routinely paid less then their male counterparts and are
discriminated against in seeking employment. 12 1 This partly explains
110. Id.
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 21.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21-22.
116. U.S. Dep't of State, Guatemala Human Rights Practice: 1993 Report 43 (1994).
117. Id.
118. Even though the legal work day is eight hours and the work week is 44 hours,
people work much longer. Human rights groups and trade union leaders assert that
workers are coerced into working overtime or even are given drugs so they can work
longer. Id. at 43-44.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 36.
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why women, who make up more than half the population, constitute
a mere 24% of those engaged in paid labor.122 Of those who work,
most work in relatively low-wage jobs, such as textiles, agriculture,
and retail. 123 Furthermore, more women than men work in the
informal sector of the economy, where wages and benefits usually are
quite low. 124 A survey conducted in 1989 showed that women
working in Guatemala City were underrepresented in high income
jobs.
125
The present bleak situation stems in part from the economic
crisis of the 1980s. During the 1980s, the economies of Central
America, including Guatemala, were gravely affected by the 1979 oil
shock, the resulting recession, lower prices of Central American exports
(i.e., bananas, coffee, sugar, and cotton), 26 and higher interest
rates.127 Until 1978, the Guatemalan economy had been steadily
increasing in productivity, but growth fell drastically during the period
of economic crisis that followed.
28
Together, these changes have had a profound effect on
Guatemala. Between 1980 and 1989, the poverty rate increased from
63% to 77% of the population."
8. Child Labor
Although the Guatemalan Constitution forbids employment of
minors below the age of fourteen, child labor is prevalent. 3 1 Many
families are unable to subsist without the financial contribution of
122. Id.
123. Interview with Rachel Garst, supra note 72.
124. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 36.
125. Id.
126. Victor Valverde et al., Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama
(INCAP), Final Report, Minimum Wage Law and Nutritional Status in Guatemala 4
(1987).
127. See Street Children, supra note 1, at 94 (prepared statement of Aaron Williams,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Latin America and the Caribbean Bureau, USAID). For
a detailed analysis of this situation, see Enrique Delgado Sieca, The Impact of the
Economic Crisis in Central America and in Guatemala (Latin American and Caribbean
Center of Florida International University, April 1985).
128. The growth in GDP in Guatemala was 5.9%. See Sieca, supra note 127.
129. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 8.
130. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 42-43.
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their children.'' Consequently, 1.6 million children are working to
support themselves or to contribute to their families' income.'32
The work that children do depends on their location. Since
children are usually uneducated'33  and untrained,'" few
opportunities exist for them. Some work in the fields with their
parents; others work away from home. Many girls are muchachas,
servants who cook and clean. Some work only during the day and
return to their families at night, but many sleep in the homes where
they work, getting one day off a week. Others work at restaurants or
stores. Boys are more likely to work on their own. Many sell
newspapers or candy. They also shine shoes, haul garbage, and
beg.
135
Unfortunately, due to structural problems with the labor court
system and the dearth of qualified labor inspectors, laws governing the
employment of minors rarely are enforced. 13 6  Consequently,
thousands of children are vulnerable to exploitation.' 3 ' They receive
no benefits, severance pay, or vacations, and they have no social
insurance. 3 ' In addition, many work below the minimum wage
level. 139
Although it is certainly not the case that all child workers will
become street children, working increases the risk. Some children will
become associated with other street children, start using drugs, and
then decide to leave home. 4 ° Others may leave home because of the
pressure they feel to earn money and the mistreatment they suffer
when they do not earn as much as they are expected to.'
Yet no easy solution exists for the problem of child labor. As a
131. Street Children, supra note 1, at 78-80 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
132. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 9.
133. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
134. Street Children, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA); interviews with Casa Alianza street educators, in Guatemala
City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
135. Street Children, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
136. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 42-43.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Street Children, supra note 1, at 6.
140. Interviews with Casa Alianza street educators, in Guatemala City, Guatemala
(July 1993).
141. Id.
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report by Childhope discusses, some forms of child labor are not
exploitative and may even provide a more fruitful future than a formal
education. 4 2 Children provide an important source of additional
income to their families. As the report states, "even when the work of
street children is harmful however, it may be crucial to the survival of
millions of families in developing countries .... Consequently, any
effort to eradicate the work of children in the informal sector without
improving the income generating potential of the family will be
ineffective.
" 143
9. Lack of Unions
Improving work conditions is not easy. For many years, people
were afraid of participating in unions because of the government's
response. Many union organizers and members have been killed and
disappeared. 1' Although no union leaders were killed in 1993, a
number were threatened, kidnapped, or physically abused.'" Today,
although union membership is up in Guatemala, it still remains low
in comparison with the United States, which is itself a relatively non-
unionized country. 14 Only 8% of the Guatemalan labor force was
organized in 1988.147
Some improvements have been made, however. In 1992, the
1947 Labor Code was amended to do a number of things, including
easing the process by which unions achieve legal status, increasing the
penalties for employers who violate labor laws, and strengthening the
ability of the Ministry of Labor and organized labor to enforce labor
violations. 14 Despite these positive changes, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts has criticized the
Guatemalan Labor Code for requiring a vote by at least two-thirds of
the workers for a strike to be legal. The ILO also opposes the
142. See generally Barker & Knaul, supra note 5.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Towell, supra note 91, at 119-22.
145. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 40.
146. In the United States, 17% of the labor force is unionized. United Nations
Development Programme, supra note 63, Table 38 (Employment). In contrast, the
unionization rates of many other countries are significantly higher. For example, the
percentage of the workforce that is unionized in a sampling of other countries is,
respectively: Sweden, 85%; Iceland, 78%; Denmark, 73%; Japan, 27%; Germany, 34%;
and the United Kingdom, 42%. Id.
147. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 48.
148. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 38.
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prohibition of strikes by agricultural workers at harvest time and any
other strike that the government determines will seriously affect the
national economy. 4 9
10. Combining These Factors: Dysfunctional Families
Although the factors described above may contribute in
isolation to the problem of street children, they often combine to create
stressful family situations. 5 ° When families come to the capital in
search of safety or a good job, they usually are disappointed. Since
parents often have only farming skills, they are unable to get jobs that
earn adequate money to support the family. This creates financial
strain and ultimately forces the children to go out and work.' 5 ' In
addition, the family is usually living in extreme poverty, with no
running water or electricity. The stress of poverty is compounded by
the fact that families do not enjoy the same support network that they
had in the countryside.'5 2 Without extended families, many parents
have no support when a job interferes with child care or an emergency
occurs. All of these factors create stress on the parents which, in many
cases, leads them to drink or to become abusive.'53
Another consequence of the poverty and the pressure is that
some men abandon their families. Abandonment is more likely when
families move from rural areas to urban slums or when one or both
parents must migrate in search of employment.' 54 For the children,
the consequence of losing a father can be traumatic. One study showed
that single women with large numbers of children are at the highest
risk of having their children work or live on the street.'5 5 Some
children are forced to leave the house in search of work; others flee
149. Id.
150. See Agnelli, supra note 4, at 47-49; Street Children, supra note 1, at 5
(statement of Carlos Palacios, former street child); id. at 5-7 (statement of Marilyn
Rocky, Regional Director, Childhope-USA); id. at 7 (statement of Donald C. Kaminsky,
Executive Director, Project Alternatives); id. at 1 (opening statement of Hon. Tony P.
Hall, Rep. from Ohio); id. at 66 (citing Lori Heise, Killing the Children of the Third
World, Wash. Post, Outlook, April 21, 1991).
151. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. Barker & Knaul, supra note 5, at 7.
155. Agnelli, supra note 4, at 50.
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stepfathers who, at best, care little for them and, at worst, abuse
them.
156
Whether fleeing a two-parent family that has disintegrated due
to poverty and pressure or fleeing an abusive stepfather, most street
children have been emotionally, sexually, and physically abused.15
Although no statistics are available from Guatemala, studies done in
other countries reflect the violence that street children have faced at
home. One researcher interviewed fifty-three girls living on the streets
of Brazil and found that 30% were orphans, 35% had experienced
sexual abuse in the home, usually from a stepfather, 80% had no
contact with their fathers, and 50% identified alcoholism as a problem
in their families. Of the fifty-three girls interviewed, all but three had
come from broken homes. 1" Another study conducted in Bogotd,
Colombia found that of the 196 children interviewed, 55% had fled
their homes because of violence, and of these, 33% said that the
perpetrator was either a stepfather or a boyfriend of their mother. 59
For children such as these, the street offers a welcome sanctuary from
the home.
II. PAST ATTEMPTS AT PROBLEM-SOLVING
Both the Guatemalan government and various non-
governmental organizations have attempted to help the street children
in Guatemala. Although many of these attempts have been well-
motivated, they have achieved limited success.
A. Government Efforts
With the election of Vinicio Cerezo as President in 1985, the
156. One survey conducted in Colombia found that 72% of street children stated that
their biological father was missing and 60% stated that a stepfather was living in the
home. See Barker & Knaul, supra note 5, at 7 (citing J. Felsman, Risk and Resiliency in
Childhood: The Lives of Street Children, in The Child in our Times (1989)). See also
Agnelli, supra note 4, at 48-49.
157. This information comes from my own personal conversations with street
children, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993), and from those of other Casa
Alianza workers.
158. Gilberto Dimenstein, Little Girls of the Night, in NACLA Report, supra note
25, at 29, 31.
159. Barker & Knaul, supra note 5, at 7 (citing J. Harrison, Muchachos de la Calle
(Gamines): Special Focus: Drug Addiction (1987) (report submitted to the InterAmerican
Drug Abuse Control Commission, Organization of American States, Washington, D.C.)).
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Guatemalan government began struggling to improve its human rights
record. The government enacted a new constitution, which guaranteed
more rights to the Guatemalan people and created a variety of
governmental human rights organizations.' 60 But it was not until
1990, after the death of Nahaman Carmona Lopez, that the
government began to focus on street children. 161 Casa Alianza's
efforts to prosecute Nahaman's killers brought a great deal of media
attention to street children.162 Letters started pouring in from around
the world, and the Guatemalan government was pressured to improve
the situation."8 As evidence of this, on December 10, 1991, the
Presidential Commissioner for International Cooperation told President
Serrano Elias that the second most significant reason for the reduction
of foreign aid to Guatemala was violence against street children.1
Although the Guatemalan government geared some actions
specifically toward street children, for the most part, their efforts have
been aimed at the human rights situation in general. Since ending the
phenomenon of street children requires grappling with many deep and
complex problems in Guatemala,65 it merits looking at these more
general reforms.
1. The 1985 Constitution
The 1985 constitution promises that life will improve for
Guatemalans.' It guarantees citizens many kinds of protection,
including Article 29, which allows people to challenge the
constitutionality of a government decision. Article 66 says that "[tihe
160. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.




164. Casa Alianza, 1991 Annual Report, supra note **, at 13.
165. See supra notes 51-159 and accompanying text.
166. The new constitution was approved on May 31, 1985, by the Guatemalan
Assembly but did not take effect until January 14, 1986, when newly-elected Vinicio
Cerezo took office. Hon. George C. Edwards & William J. Butler, Guatemala: A New
Beginning: Report of a Mission on Behalf of the American Association for the
International Commission of Jurists 3 (1987). For an English translation of many parts
of the Guatemalan Constitution pertinent to human rights issues, see The Minnesota
Lawyers' International Human Rights Committee, Justice Suspended: The Failure of the
Habeas Corpus System in Guatemala 120 (1990) [hereinafter Minnesota Lawyers'
Report).
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State recognizes, respects and encourages the indigenous peoples of
Guatemala."' 7 The constitution also says that indigenous people
should be able to maintain their land in its traditional form, and that
cooperatives should be given extra support."
2. Ratifying International Human Rights Law
Guatemala has shown at least a superficial commitment to
improving the human rights situation by ratifying various human
rights conventions. In January 1987, Guatemala was the first member
country of the Organization of American States to ratify the American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.'69 Guatemala did not
sign the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it did sign the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
May 1988.170 Most importantly, Guatemala was the sixth member
country of the United Nations to ratify the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.' In 1990, Guatemala signed the World Declaration for
the Survival, Development, and Protection of Children.'7 2 Although
Article 3 of Guatemala's 1985 constitution gives precedence over
national law to human rights treaties and conventions that have been
ratified by Guatemala, these treaties have not, as yet, been taken
seriously.'7 3
3. Human Rights Commission of Congress
The Guatemalan Constitution created the Human Rights
Commission of Congress as a means of improving the human rights
situation in Guatemala. 174 In pursuit of this end, the Commission
has several responsibilities. First, it seeks to improve the
understanding of human rights within Guatemala through studies,
seminars, and investigations. Second, it must investigate complaints
167. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 34.
168. Id. at 32-33.
169. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 38.
170. Id.
171. Casa Alianza 1991 Annual Report, supra note **, at 2.
172. Street Children, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Per Engebak, American
Representative, UNICEF).
173. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 13-14.
174. Telephone interview with Anne Manuel, Human Rights Watch/Americas (Oct.
1995).
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brought to its attention by national and international sources and
must recommend solutions. Finally it is responsible for evaluating
existing Guatemalan law in relation to existing national and
international human rights norms. 75
Despite the initial feeling of hope, the Commission has
achieved limited success. In part, the problem is due to fear;
vindicating human rights is a dangerous business in Guatemala, and
Commission members have good cause to fear for their lives.
17
Furthermore, the Commission is not well funded. Its budget of U.S
$200 a month17 is so low that the president of the Commission,
Oliverio Garcia Rodas, can only afford to pay two staff people, and he
must get assistance from the employees of his private law office. 7 '
Finally, the Commission is not taken very seriously by the Guatemalan
Congress. It has a limited mandate which makes it ineffective. 
7
1
4. The Human Rights Commissioner
The 1985 constitution created the position of human rights
commissioner, or ombudsman."s The ombudsman is selected by the
Guatemalan Congress from one of three candidates nominated by the
Human Rights Commission.'' In addition to the official ombudsman,
there are five regional offices staffed by lawyers who have received one
month's training.8 2
The ombudsman's role is to receive and evaluate complaints,
carry out initial investigations, and then turn cases over to the proper
judicial authorities. He can intervene to speed up a judicial
investigation if the need arises. The ombudsman also must publish an
annual report.'"' Most importantly, the ombudsman has significant
power to investigate individual allegations of human rights abuses. He
can investigate any premises or installations, whether public or
175. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 34-35.
176. Americas Watch, supra note 90, at 57.
177. Id.
178. Minnesota Lawyers' Report, supra note 166, at 28.
179. Americas Watch, supra note 90, at 57.
180. Guatemala: The Prospects for Peace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western
Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong., lt Sess. 36-37
(1993) [hereinafter Guatemala Prospects] (statement of Ernesto R. Viteri, Member of the
Guatemalan Government Delegation to the Peace Negotiations).
181. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 35.
182. Id. at 36.
183. Id. at 35-36.
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private, without prior notification.' He also has subpoena powers
and the authority to commence proceedings against any violator.'8
Although the ombudsman has significant legal power to
investigate alleged human rights violations, many obstacles exist
which interfere with his taking full advantage of this power. These
obstacles include lack of support from the government'86 and
physical threats."7 Consequently, unless the ombudsman is strong-
minded and willing to risk his life, he is unlikely to get anything
accomplished.
The success of the ombudsmen has been mixed. The first
ombudsman, Gonzalo Men~ndez de la Riva, was appointed in 1987.18
He was criticized for ineffectiveness because he did not conduct
investigations quickly and did not hold violators accountable for their
deeds. Mendndez de la Riva resigned on October 10, 1989.89
Ramiro de L6on Carpio, now President of Guatemala, was
elected human rights ombudsman in December 1989. Human rights
activists applauded his investigatory work and credited him for
publicly denouncing human rights violations as no other government
official in Guatemala ever had."9 In addition, de Le6n Carpio focused
on children. He took seriously the Declaration of the International
Rights of the Child.' 9' He also created the Commission of Pursuit of
184. Id.
185. Id. at 35-37.
186. In de L4on Carpio's 1992 report, he discussed the lack of governmental support
that he received and requested more. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 52, at 19. See also Human Rights Watch/Americas, Human Rights in
Guatemala 32-33 (1994) (describing the experience of Ombudsman Jorge Mario Garcia
Laguardia while trying to investigate a murder and injuries in Los Naranjales during
President de Lon Carpio's first year in office).
187. See Options for United States Policy Toward Guatemala: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House of Rep., 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
59-60 (1990) [hereinafter Options] (statement of Anne Manuel, Human Rights
Watch/Americas) (describing the danger Adjunct Ombudsman Cdsar Alvarez Guadamuz
exposed himself to when he agreed to accompany villagers of the town of Parraxtut back
to their homes after they had fled due to threats from the military for resigning from the
civil patrols).
188. Id. at 37-38.
189. Id.
190. "During his term as human rights ombudsman, de Le6n Carpio had
energetically investigated and publicly denounced human rights violations, something
no government official had done before in Guatemala." Human Rights Watch/Americas,
supra note 186, at 4.
191. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 38.
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the Fulfillment of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, and the
Commission on Prevention of Abuse of Children.
192
Unfortunately, the current human rights ombudsman, Jorge
Mario Garcia Laguardia, has not been as outspoken as de Le6n Carpio.
Garcia Laguardia has not put resources into developing the
investigative wing of his office. Indeed, he informed Human Rights
Watch/Americas that he does not believe his office should pursue
investigations as it did when de Le6n Carpio was ombudsman.'93 To
his credit, however, he sent a formal request to the Human Rights
Commission of the Guatemalan Congress to rescind legal authority for
the civil patrols."9
5. COPREDEH: Presidential Commission to Coordinate
Executive Policy in Human Rights
Established by President Serrano in July 1991, COPREDEH
coordinates the actions of the executive branches and guarantees
communication between the judiciary and the ombudsman.
195
COPREDEH is comprised of representatives of the president, the
ministers of foreign affairs, the interior and the national defense, in
addition to the attorney general.' 96 It strives to foster respect for
human rights among all governmental organizations. 97
Like the other governmental human rights organizations,
COPREDEH is hindered by its lack of real authority. For example,
Casa Alianza requested physical protection for a street educator named
Axel Mejia. Mejia had received death threats for stopping thirteen
members of the state security forces from beating up three street
children. Although COPREDEH helped Casa Alianza to secure this
protection, it was not very successful. The Ministry of the Interior
approved two positions within the National Police to protect Mejia.
Mejia had waited three months for the police to approve the Ministry
of the Interior's request, and even then he was not secure. The two
bodyguards were constantly followed by the National Police and were
eventually detained. Both ended up going to trial for vaguely defined
192. Inter-American Committee on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 98.
193. Human Rights Watch/Americas, supra note 186, at 122.
194. The Civil Patrols receive their legal authority from Decree Law 19-86. It is this
law that Garcia Laguardia asked be derogated. Id. at 14.
195. Inter-American Committee on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 20.
196. Id.
197. Id.
1995] STREET CHILDREN IN GUATEMALA CITY 85
crimes. Casa Alianza believes that the police arranged the arrest of
these two guards so that Mejia would be left unprotected and
vulnerable. 
19
6. The Minors' Section of the Public Ministry
The Minors' Section of the Public Ministry was created to
protect the general welfare of children, but it lacks the resources to
fulfill its responsibility. Children being represented by the Public
Ministry are unlikely to have their cases pursued thoroughly and with
care. As of late 1991, the Public Ministry had only five lawyers to
represent the approximately five million minors in Guatemala.' 99
Not only does the Public Ministry lack the means to fulfill its
responsibility, but it also lacks the desire. On November 3, 1991, Casa
Alianza signed an agreement with the Public Ministry aimed at
coordinating their efforts to help the street children of Guatemala. The
agreement named the Casa Alianza Legal Aid Office as an auxiliary
member of the Public Ministry, which authorized its staff to enter
government centers to which they had not before had access.2' Casa
Alianza did not renew the accord in 1992 because it felt that the Public
Ministry was not fulfilling its obligations under the contract.20 ' The
Public Ministry did not uphold its financial obligations, nor did it
cooperate in investigations or followups on lawsuits. Instead, the
Public Ministry used its agreement with Casa Alianza as a political
tool when seeking foreign aid.20 2
7. Reforms in the Criminal Justice System
Historically, one of the biggest obstacles to the effective
prosecution of perpetrators of human rights abuses has been a weak
criminal justice system. Allegations of human rights abuses are rarely
198. Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note **, at 7.
199. Casa Alianza, 1991 Annual Report, supra note **, at 9; Casa Alianza, 1992
Annual Report, supra note **, at 9.
200. Interviews with Bruce Harris, Director of Casa Alianza, and Casa Alianza
Legal Aid staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
201. Id.
202. Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note **, at 7-9.
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investigated and the police often lose or destroy key evidence. 08
Even when the perpetrators are prosecuted, the proceedings are often
dismissed or stalled by judges. °' Guatemala has recently made
efforts to grapple with these problems and to strengthen the criminal
justice system.0 5 Although the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights concluded that "there really is a greater will during this
administration than in the previous one and in the jurisdictional
agencies to pursue cases against government agents who violate
human rights," impunity is still a serious problem.2" This is because
the superiors of the perpetrators are rarely, if ever, held
accountable.2 "7
a. Increasing the Number of Prosecutors
In April 1991, new legislation that established the Office of the
General Prosecutor of the Republic was introduced." 5 The legislation
also doubled the salary of the public prosecutor. °9 The number of
prosecutors increased from 58 (36 in the capital and 22 in the interior)
to 350, so that each city with a population over 5000 could be
served.21 °
203. The investigation of the murder of Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack is
perhaps the most infamous example of such incompetence and corruption. See Inter-
American Committee on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 22-26; see also infra notes
221-24 and accompanying text.
204. Inter-American Committee on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 26-29;
Minnesota Lawyers' Report, supra note 166, at iii.
205. One of the most influential reform efforts was the Guatemala/Harvard Criminal
Justice Project. From July 1987 to December 1990, a group from Harvard University
Law School was in Guatemala trying to reform the Guatemalan justice system. The
Project was funded by USAID and the group was working in conjunction with the
Guatemalan Supreme Court. In addition to providing an extensive critique and list of
suggestions for what Guatemala should do to improve its criminal justice system, the
Project set up pilot courts in which the group taught judges how to conduct trials with
oral arguments. Despite its successes, the Harvard group left in 1990 because of the
number of human rights violations and the Project members' feeling that the
Guatemalan government was doing little to address the problem. See Options, supra note
187, at 4-6, 16-19 (statement of Philip Benjamin Heymann, head of the Center for
Criminal Justice, Harvard University Law School); see also id. at 34-41 (letter from
Philip Benjamin Heymann).
206. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 29.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 20.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 21.
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b. A New Code of Criminal Procedure
There have also been more radical changes. A new code of
criminal procedure was brought before Congress in 1991 and became
law in September 1992. It went into effect in September 1994.211 This
code does several things, including allowing oral and public trials,212
letting public prosecutors participate more in investigations, giving
judges control over the imposition of penalties, and creating greater
procedural guarantees and defense in trials.21 3
c. Strengthening the Judiciary
The new constitution strengthened the judiciary by giving it a
fixed proportion of the budget.2 4 As of late 1992, the judiciary had
a U.S. $20 million budget expansion.2 15 Judicial power was increased
further by requiring that judges go with the police on all
investigations." 6 In addition, the number of lawyers that supervise
the courts has increased from three to seventy-five, and judges are now
trained specifically for criminal, juvenile, and family cases.1 7
A judicial studies school has also been established,1 8 in
addition to a constitutional court which has the power to repeal any
211. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 37 (statement ofErnesto R. Viteri,
Member of the Guatemalan Government Delegation to the Peace Negotiations).
212. In their final paper, the Harvard group, see supra note 205, made several
critiques and suggestions. One of the most serious problems they discussed was the lack
of oral proceedings. They argued that without oral proceedings, "the judge makes a
decision without ever having observed witnesses or listened to their testimony, and
rarely having viewed the physical evidence." Guatemala/Harvard Criminal Justice
Project, Final Report 19 (1991). Without oral arguments, public scrutiny of the judicial
decision-making process is impossible; thus, corruption is more likely. See Options, supra
note 187, at 11-13 (statement of Philip Benjamin Heymann, head of the Center for
Criminal Justice, Harvard University Law School).
213. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 15.
214. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 39.
215. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 20. It is not
stated whether this budget expansion is due to the fact that the judiciary receives more
from the Guatemalan government or more in international aid.
216. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 39.
217. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 20.
218. Id.
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executive or congressional law which it deems unconstitutional.219
Furthermore, the new constitution allows indigenous laws to be
considered by courts.220
d. A Critique of These Reforms
Many problems remain, however. The threat of violence causes
many judges to dismiss prominent cases that have sufficient evidence
to result in conviction.22 1 One particularly egregious example of
judges being affected by violence is the case of the Guatemalan
anthropologist Myrna Mack, who was killed by Guatemalan security
forces on September 11, 1990.222 Most of the twelve judges who have
presided over the case have tried to resign out of fear for their
lives.' Since the principal police investigator was killed after he
identified Mack's killer (a former Sergeant Major Specialist) in court,
and since many witnesses have had to go into exile because of death
threats, the judges have good reason to be frightened.2 '
In addition, cases are stalled for interminable periods of time.
On August 3, 1992, Casa Alianza brought seventeen complaints
against seven judges to the Supervisor of the Judicial System in an
attempt to expedite the judicial process. Nevertheless, these cases still
remain stagnant.22
8. Reforming the Police
In Guatemala, the police are infamous for corruption and
cruelty.22 6 The situation is so bad that many Guatemalans do not
trust the police to protect their homes and businesses but instead hire
private security guards.2 27 Although some attempts at reform have
219. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 39. See Guat. Const.
art. 268.
220. Guat. Const. art. 268.
221. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 116, at 29-30.
222. Id. at 30.
223. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 4 (statement of Helen Mack,
member of the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala and sister of the
murdered anthropologist Myrna Mack).
224. Id.
225. Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note **, at 9.
226. Americas Watch, supra note 90, at 19-22; Interviews with Casa Alianza staff,
in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993); Victor Perera, supra note 97, at 165.
227. Hiring private security guards is also problematic. See infra notes 326-31 and
accompanying text.
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been made, many more steps need to be taken before the police can be
trusted to uphold the law instead of violating it.
The Guatemalan police have been heavily criticized for their
ineffectiveness. According to a study conducted by Florida
International University, 80% of the lawyers and judges surveyed were
dissatisfied with the help the police gave to the courts.2" Specifically,
the police have been heavily criticized for their inadequacy in
conducting investigations. 229 This is particularly true when army
culpability is suspected. 23°  Both poor training"' and a low
education level232 have been cited as causes for the ineffectiveness of
the police.
Corruption is also a serious problem. Fifty percent of the
lawyers and judges surveyed by Florida International University
indicated that police corruption was high.233 In addition, street
children frequently complain that the police threaten to hurt them
unless the children steal sunglasses or gold chains for them.'
According to Carlos Rafael Soto, former National Police Public
Relations Director, the root of the problem is low police pay. As Soto
told Americas Watch in a July 1988 interview:
They're almost all corrupt, they have to be. A cop makes
Q400 ($140) per month, but he's got a quota he has to pay to
his superior once a week. In order to simply pay off his
superior, he has to take bribes. Then, he has to keep his job.
A police agent position sells for Q780 ($300), but after you've
been on the force for four months, you're 'fired' if you don't
come up with another Q780. You either find the money-it
has to be bribes, who's going to save that much on Q400 a
228. Guatemala/Harvard Criminal Justice Project, Final Report, supra note 212, at
35.
229. See Options, supra note 187, at 21-26 (statement of Philip Benjamin Heymann,
head of the Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School).
230. Americas Watch, supra note 90, at 21-22.
231. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 15 (statement of Robert G.
Torricelli, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs).
232. As an example of this, during the Cerezo administration (1985-1990), the
average education level of police officers was third grade. Harvard Criminal Justice
Project, Final Report, supra note 212, at 68.
233. Id. at 35.
234. Interviews with Casa Alianza street educators and street children, in
Guatemala City, Guatemala (Summer 1993).
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month?--or someone else does. M
5
Unfortunately, if Soto is right, corruption is destined to
continue. Although a police officer's monthly salary has been raised
nominally since 1988, because of inflation and the declining value of
the quetzal, it is worth less.23 6 In 1990, police officers made Q425 a
month (less than U.S. $100), and there was no differentiation based on
merit or experience.3 7
Several attempts have been made to curtail the abuse and
corruption of police officers. By 1988, U.S. $24.5 million in
international aid was given for police reform, including administrative
restructuring, technological change, and establishing a missing persons
section. In addition, national training courses were set up.2 8 An
Office of Professional Responsibility was created by the police
department, but it is not very strict.239 Furthermore, human rights
are now officially included in police training, but lawyers who do the
training are not themselves trained in human rights." °
Many human rights activists believe that the most effective
way to end police abuses and to create police efficacy in investigating
crimes is to demilitarize the police.24' For the past forty years, the
chief of police has almost always been a member of the military.2 42
De Leon Carpio's most widely acclaimed reform as President thus far
has been initiating the demilitarization of the police.'
Unfortunately, it is unclear how effective these attempts will be, since
the engineers of the reform were replaced with supporters of the
235. Americas Watch, supra note 90, at 20-21.
236. Telephone interview with Rachel Garst, Washington Office on Latin America
(Nov. 28, 1995) (citing Inter-American Development Bank, 1995 Report, at 308 (1995)).
237. Minnesota Lawyers' Report, supra note 166, at 24.
238. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 30-31.
239. See Minnesota Lawyers' Report, supra note 166, at 24 (citing Gros Espiel, 1990
Report, add. 1, at 9).
240. Id. at 25.
241. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 16 (statement of Robert G.
Torricelli, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs); id. (statement of Helen Mack, member of the Human Rights
Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala and sister of the murdered Guatemalan
anthropologist Myrna Mack); id. at 13 (statement of Frank R. LaRue, Director, Center
for Human Rights Legal Action).
242. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 15 (statement of Ernesto Viteri,
representative of the Guatemalan government delegation to the peace negotiation).
243. See Human Rights Watch/Americas, supra note 186, at 2.
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military.'
9. Land Reform
The National Agrarian Transfer Project was one attempt to
solve Guatemala's land problems. From January 1986 to 1988, the
government bought land from large private farmers and distributed it
to 9612 peasants, who were to repay the government through twenty-
year, interest-free loans. 5 The National Agrarian Transformation
Institute Deputy said in May 1989 that these policies were limited in
their ability to grapple with the growing problem of rural
landlessness.2 46
10. Social Programs
In 1990, less than U.S. $2 million, or .4% of total public
spending, was spent on social assistance and welfare. This translates
into less than one quetzal per child.2 4' Perhaps realizing that this
amount was never going to solve Guatemala's problems, President
Serrano created the "Human Development, Children and Youth"
policy.2
Part of this policy included a program created in 1991 to help
widows and orphans of the war assimilate better into society.24 9
Although the president hoped that the plan would aid 25,000 widows
and 12,000 orphans, by 1992, only 894 women and their children had
been reached.25 °
In September 1991, President Serrano created community
homes to give care and education to children up to age six."' These
"care moms," as they were called, were specially trained members of
the community who were given fifteen quetzals a month to care for
each child.252 Serrano's goal was to have 50,000 children in
households by 1996. In 1993, there were 1735 children in homes, about
244. Id. at 2-3.
245. See generally Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 78, at 45.
246. Id.
247. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 9.
248. Id. at 9-11.
249. Id. at 96.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 95-96.
252. Id.
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.1% of poor Guatemalan children.
253
Part of this policy also included creating four juvenile centers:
the first was to place and diagnose delinquents; the second was to
observe street children; the third was to care for boys; and the fourth
was to care for girls.2 In 1991, 79% of the children sent to the
state's "Juvenile Treatment and Orientation Program" (TOM) escaped
and returned to the streets. 5 Although Gretchen W. Mendez, a
social worker for the state, asserted that the government centers had
improved, there were still stories of abuse and refusals of service.'
On a more successful note, President Serrano has instituted a
program in which 1.5 million children receive a school snack and
school supplies." Furthermore, urban students may use public
transportation to get to school for free. 8
Serrano designed his policy to last for the years of his
administration, from 1991 to 1996. 259 After reading some of his
plans, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was not
impressed. They said:
The Commission finds that the resources allocated to social
problems represent a portion of GNP that is disproportionate
to the magnitude of the inequalities in internal distribution.
Even assuming the goals proposed for the periods 1992-1996
and 1996-2000 are achieved, the social inequalities will
remain and continue to be serious and discriminatory.
2 6
0
B. Non-governmental Attempts to Help Street Children
Although the government has made efforts to improve the
human rights situation generally, it has not focused much attention on
street children in particular. Aware of the dearth of government social
programs to help street children, a number of private organizations
have been created to address the issue. Casa Alianza has received both
253. Id.
254. Id. at 96.
255. Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note **, at 13-14.
256. Interview with Gretchen W. Mendez, in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Aug. 6,
1993).
257. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 52, at 96.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 9.
260. Id. at 12.
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national and international acclaim for its work with street
children.2 6' It was recently among the recipients of U.S. $3 million
from USAID set aside for a project to help street children.
2 62 Since
I spent an extended period of time working with Casa Alianza, I will
describe its programs.2 3
1. A Focus on Casa Alianza
To help the children get off the streets and into more stable
home settings, Casa Alianza has designed a four-step program. These
steps include: the street educators, the refugios, the transition homes,
and the group homes. In addition, there is a program for drug addicts
and a legal aid office. From January through June 1993, there were
1378 residents in Casa Alianza programs. In June 1993 alone, there
were 522 residents.26 '
a. Stage One: The Street Educators
The street educators provide attention and basic medical care.
Presently, there are eight educators who work in Guatemala City.
They go out every day except Sunday, including Saturday nights. The
educators divide into groups so that they can spend concentrated time
in certain areas. For safety reasons, they try to go out in male/female
pairs. As often as possible, one of the two is a foreigner. This
arrangement best protects the Guatemalan educators, who are then
less likely to be harassed. The street educators walk every day except
on Saturday nights, when they take a car.
In addition to giving basic first aid, the street educators also
bring colored pencils and pictures for the children to color. When a
child has injuries that require more serious medical attention, the
educators take him or her to see a nurse at the boys' or girls' crisis
center and, if necessary, to the hospital.
They give no food, clothing or money. As former street educator
Christina McNeff explained, the children must accept the consequences
261. Id. at 97.
262. USAID/Guatemala, Central American Programs Highlights (1995) (on file
with author).
263. The information in the section on Casa Alianza is from Casa Alianza's statistics
(on file with author), or from interviews with Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (Summer 1993).
264. Casa Alianza statistics (July 1993) (on file with author).
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of their decision to live on the street. They know that if they want food
or clothing, they can get it at either the boys' or girls' crisis center.
The educators also take the street children out for three or four
activities a month. They might take them swimming or to a farm to
play soccer. The only rule is that the children cannot be under the
influence of drugs or have any drugs in their possession. The goal of
these activities is three-fold: first, Casa Alianza wants the children to
stop using drugs; second, it wants the children to engage in athletics
since they get little recreation time on the street, and third, it wants
the children to enter Casa Alianza. Street educator Wellington Tello
estimates that one or two children enter the crisis center after each
activity.
The street educators' job is a difficult one. They seek to gain
the trust of the children in hopes of convincing them to leave the
streets and enter Casa Alianza. Gaining a person's trust is always a
challenging task, but when a child has been abused by parents and the
police, it becomes even harder. In addition, the street educators keep
daily records of who they see. This allows Casa Alianza to estimate the
number of street children in Guatemala City. Finally, the educators
often are the first people to discover when street children have been
abused by the police or others.
b. Stage Two: The Refugios
There are refugios, or crisis centers, for both girls and boys.
They admit children at any time of the day or night, as long as they
do not smell like drugs or have any in their possession. This restriction
exists because most of the children in the refugios have drug problems,
and Casa Alianza does not want them to be further tempted. The
refugios offer shelter, food, and clothing to children who have just left
the streets. In an attempt to help children make the transition from
life on the street to life in a home, the refugios provide activities,
require the children to do some chores, and offer counseling.
After President Serrano's attempt to seize dictatorial powers in
May 1993 by dissolving the Supreme Court and Congress, suspending
constitutional rights, and arresting the human rights ombudsman,2"
many children came off the streets and into the refugios. No one knew
265. For a more detailed discussion of President Serrano's bid for absolute power,
see Human Rights Watch/Americas, supra note 186, at 126-29.
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what was going to happen, and they went to the refugios for
protection.2
c. Stage Three: The Transition Homes
Children who stay continuously in the refugios for three
months are ready to move on to the hogares de transition, or transition
homes. Since children have different needs, this rule is not unyielding.
Some children may enter the transition homes much earlier. The
transition homes are smaller and more stable then the refugios. There
are two transition homes, one for boys (twenty-person capacity) and
one for girls (fifteen-person capacity).
d. Stage Four: The Group Homes
The final step in the process is the group home. There are
fifteen group homes in Antigua, the former capital of Guatemala, and
ten in Guatemala City, with approximately fifteen children per home.
In addition, there is a home in Nebaj, a city in the highlands of the
Quiche region. The other inhabitants of these homes become the
children's families. The children live there until they turn eighteen,
and all of them study and work.
e. Drug Rehabilitation Programs
Drug addiction is one of the most serious problems street
children have. Since there are no government programs dealing with
drug addiction, Casa Alianza has designed programs for the most
seriously addicted. Boys with severe drug problems can go to Nujuyu,
a drug rehabilitation program, instead of the refugio.
Nujuyu is located in Magdalena Milpas Altas between
Guatemala City and Antigua. It sits on a huge plot of land, which
allows the children to pick fruit and play outdoor games. As with all
of Casa Alianza's programs, the children are free to leave at any time,
but it helps that they are removed from the temptations of Guatemala
City.
At Nujuyu, the children receive more individual attention than
in the other programs. There are five educators for a maximum of
266. Interview with Carlos Toledo, Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (July 13, 1993).
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twenty-five residents in Nujuyu, and children see a psychologist for
both group and private sessions once a week. According to Program
Director Oscar Toledo, Nujuyu has about a 35% success rate in getting
children through the program drug-free.
26 7
Once the children have been there for three months, they are
usually ready to move on to Alamos, a transition home for drug
addicts. At Alamos, there are two educators, and as in regular
transition homes, children can begin going to school and working.
About 70% of the children who enter Alamos make it through the
three-month program drug-free. When the children are ready, they
move to group homes. At this point, they become integrated with the
children who went through the non-drug-crisis route.
f. A Program Designed Specifically to Help Young
Mothers
Although fewer girls live on the streets than boys, girls' unique
needs also must be met.2  In addition to its other facilities devoted
exclusively to girls, Casa Alianza has created a special program to help
street girls who are also mothers or who are pregnant. The program
seeks to detoxify young mothers and to teach them to be responsible
for themselves and their children. Nifia/Madre offers girls extensive
counseling and tries to rebuild the girls' self-esteem. Although it tries
to reintegrate the girls into their families, it does not force girls to
leave after a certain period of time. Nifia/Madre is equipped to handle
about sixteen mothers and their children.
g. Auxiliary Program: The Legal Aid Office
In addition to its homes, Casa Alianza has a legal aid office. It
helps all the children, whether on the street or in a program, to get
identification papers and to make formal complaints if they are
mistreated. It conducts investigations and puts pressure on the Public
Ministry and the judicial system to take the complaints seriously. It
also helps Casa Alianza workers who have been threatened.
267. Interview with Oscar Toledo, Casa Alianza staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala
(July 1993).
268. An article in Siglo Veintuno from July 24, 1993, estimated that about 33% of
the street children are girls. See El Drama de los Niflos, supra note 15.
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h. Family Reintegration Program 9
The Family Reintegration Program strives to accomplish an
extremely difficult task-reintegrating street children into their
families. In the late fall of 1993, USAID gave Casa Alianza funding to
implement the program, and in January 1994, the program began.
Since that time, the program has achieved remarkable success. As of
June 1995, 169 children had been reintegrated into their families.
Reintegration demands much time and energy. To begin, Casa
Alianza staff must choose a suitable candidate for reintegration. Once
a child is selected from the Casa Alianza programs, intensive
counseling occurs separately with the child and the family. Staff
members look for the reasons the child left initially and do their best
to address these problems. Only when the child and family are ready
will the child return home.
Even then, Casa Alianza still maintains contact. Case workers
make frequent visits, and both the child and the parents continue
counseling. Parenting classes are also available and encouraged.
Taking into account the considerable time and expense,27 ° it
is impressive that Casa Alianza has succeeded in reintegrating 169
children. At this point, however, no attrition statistics have been
compiled. As Beth Hogan of USAID in Guatemala pointed out, even
with intensive counseling, many of the problems underlying the
behavior of runaways may be insolvable. Some children simply prefer
the freedom of life on the street, despite the hardship and regardless
of whether their home situations have improved.2 71
2. A Critique of Casa Alianza
Despite Casa Alianza's successes, it also has some serious
problems. The biggest problem is underfunding. Since there are only
about eight street educators at any time, Casa Alianza can cover only
269. Information about this program comes from a telephone interview with Rachel
Garst, Washington Office on Latin America (Nov. 17, 1995).
270. USAID allotted Casa Alianza $136,000 over three years. This amount of money
was supposed to cover both the Family Reintegration Program and a training program,
including manuals, for Casa Alianza staff. Rachel Garst of the Washington Office on
Latin America was extremely impressed by how well Casa Alianza was using its money.
Id.
271. Id.
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three of Guatemala City's twenty-one zones.272 The zones are large,
and each street educator pair can only visit a handful of the locations
that street children frequent. More street educators would allow Casa
Alianza to go into more neighborhoods and to reach out to more
children.
The legal aid office is also in need of more funding."'
Although the legal aid office offers competent legal help to street
children, it is understaffed. There is only one fully-certified lawyer, and
although there are four law students who do much of the work, one
lawyer is simply not enough to meet the demands of 5000 street
children. 4
More crisis centers are also needed. The Casa Alianza crisis
center for boys is large and crowded and located in the middle of
Guatemala City. Although the centers may be good for the first few
nights, the temptations of the street become too much for some of the
children and they leave. Casa Alianza needs additional crisis centers
in rural areas, with a lot of space, so that the children can play. The
preference many children have for a rural setting is exemplified by the
fact that some street children say they will go to Nuhuyu but not to
the crisis center. The biggest differences between the two are size
(Nuhuyu cares for fewer children and gives them more individualized
attention) and location (Nuhuyu is in the countryside and has a lot of
land for the children to play on).
Not only does Casa Alianza need more crisis centers, but it also
needs a facility that will make it easier for children to make the
transition from street life to the refugio. At present, street educators
can only offer street children basic first aid, pictures to color, and
comfort. Although these are important, they are not enough. For a
child to satisfy any more of her needs through Casa Alianza, she must
make the enormous step of giving up drugs. Before she can even enter
272. Interviews with Casa Alianza street educators and staff, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (Summer 1993).
273. Id.
274. In Guatemala, getting a law degree takes about seven years after high school.
Students must do four years of course work and then do a practica, during which time
they do actual legal work. They then take an examination and then write a thesis. All
of the law students who work in the Legal Aid Office are working on their practica.
Interview with Marvin Rabanales, Casa Alianza Staff, in Guatemala City, Guatemala
(July 1993). Licenciado Rudi de Leon was the only lawyer working for Casa Alianza in
the summer of 1993. Gustavo Rodolfo de Leon Rodas has since replaced him. As of
November 1994, there were four law students working for Casa Alianza.
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the crisis center, her breath must not smell like glue, which requires
that she has not inhaled glue for several hours. For the majority of
children, this is simply too big a step to take. Instead, Casa Alianza
would be wise to design an in-between step that would give children
the support necessary to make this transition. For example, Casa
Alianza could have a separate crisis center where children could go for
the time it requires to rid their breath of the smell of glue.
In addition to these problems, some believe that Casa Alianza
suffers from an unforgivable structural problem: it provides long-term
residential care.275 In these experts' opinions, homes offering a
substitute family are problematic for several reasons. First, they make
children dependent on charity, thus promoting passivity both among
residents and among those who hope to become residents. Second,
homes like Casa Alianza offer a lifestyle that children cannot maintain
once they leave, thus creating unrealistic expectations that can lead to
bitterness.2 7 6 Instead, these critics suggest that non-residential,
community-based organizations be set up. These are aimed at
encouraging children to learn marketable skills while remaining in
their communities and not breaking ties to their families.277
Although this criticism has some merit when applied to
children who maintain ties to family members, it is less applicable
when applied to children who are abandoned or who are unwilling to
return home. Many of the children I met at Casa Alianza were either
orphans or had suffered such extreme abuse at home that they had no
desire to return. For those children, a substitute family is extremely
important.
More importantly, Casa Alianza's recently created Family
Reintegration Program27' represents a concerted effort to restore
children to their communities. By attempting to grapple with the
underlying problems that drive children to flee their homes, Casa
Alianza makes it easier for children to return home. In addition,
intensive therapy for both parents and children increases the
likelihood that the reintegration process will succeed. Although the
reintegration of 169 children represents a significant success, it is still
small in comparison with the number of street children in Guatemala
275. See Agnelli, supra note 4, at 75-76.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
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City."' Casa Alianza needs more funding like that given by USAID
in order to expand this valuable program to help more children and
families.
C. International Efforts to Help Street Children
In 1993, USAID funded the four-year, $3 million Street
Children Support Project.2 ° The Project's general goal is three-fold:
to improve the human rights situation of children by raising public
awareness, to enhance the environment in which policy regarding
children's rights is formulated, and to strengthen the ability of private
volunteer organizations to provide services to needy children. 1 The
Project aims to help children who live on the street, who work on the
street, or who have been abused." 2
Philosophically, the Project is based on the belief that,
regardless of what measures are taken, a population of children will
always live on the street.2 In addition, the Project acts on the
principle that the greatest success will be achieved by trying to lower
the number of children who opt to live on the street and by giving
them services that satisfy their basic needs and protect their rights
once they are on the street.2"
In practical terms, the Project differs from many other service
providers. Instead of devoting all its resources to offering basic
necessities to those already living on the street while trying to get
them to leave the street, the Project grapples with the deeper problems
that drive children onto the street or cause them to be abused in the
first place.'
To accomplish these goals, USAID gave money to Casa
Alianza, PAMI,2"7  and the Office of the Human Rights
279. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
280. USAID, USAID/Guatemala-Central American Programs: Highlights (1995).






286. For a description of Casa Alianza's programs, see supra notes 263-78 and
accompanying text.
287. PAMI is a local non-governmental organization. PAMI stands for Proyecto de
Ayuda Maternale. Telephone interview with Beth Hogan, USAID/Guatemala (Nov. 17,
1995).
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Ombudsman.' As described above, Casa Alianza has used its money
to create the Family Reintegration Program, which, thus far, has
achieved remarkable success.' 9 In addition, Casa Alianza has used
the money to strengthen its staff training program.29°
PAMI used USAID's money to channel resources into
grassroots organizations. 29' More importantly, PAMI has helped local
NGOs in project planning and design.292 When USAID first
envisioned the Project, it thought that local NGOs would simply write
grants requesting money. USAID found that, apart from Casa Alianza,
most NGOs were not very adept at formulating proposals.2 3 In the
eighteen months since the Project started, PAMI has done an
exceptionally good job at helping local NGOs with project planning and
design.2' Among the programs that PAMI has helped to develop are
outreach programs, micro-enterprise development programs, and a sex
education program for girl prostitutes, which uses peer counselors who
are identified as leaders and then given proper training. 29
Finally, the Project gave money to the Office of the Human
Rights Ombudsman.' The money was intended for several purposes:
to work on the Codigo de Menores (Code for the Protection of
Children's Rights), to fund a national education campaign about
children's rights, to provide training to the ombudsman's staff
members, and to fund a hotline service that would allow the
Ombudsman's Office to receive complaints about human rights
violations against street children. 7 Although work has begun on
these plans, the Ombudsman's Office has suffered from planning
problems similar to those suffered by the local NGOs.295 To address
this problem, USAID gave PAMI authority to help the Ombudsman's
Office with its project design and implementation. 99
In the eighteen months since the Project began, it has been
288. For a description of the responsibilities of the ombudsman, see supra notes
180-187 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
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successful. The high number of children who have been reunited with
their families through Casa Alianza's Family Reintegration Program
and the interesting array of programs that PAMI has helped to
organize are indicative of this success. With over a year left in the
Project, much more is likely to be accomplished.
III. ALTERNATIVES: NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEM-SOLVING
Although past attempts to help street children have achieved
some success, more can and should be done. If American policy-makers
are serious about changing the situation for street children in
Guatemala, they should pursue both short- and long-term goals. First,
they should focus on helping children leave the streets by giving money
to direct service providers that have proved successful in the past.
Second, they should work on ending abuses against street children.
Finally, they should take measures to stop future generations of
Guatemalans from becoming street children.
A. Helping Children to Leave the Streets
Direct service providers like Casa Alianza are the best way to
help street children change their lives. They have the most immediate,
everyday contact with the children. Not only should existing
organizations be better funded, but alternative models, especially ones
that have proved successful elsewhere, should be tried. °°
The overwhelming opinion of those who work with street
children, both in the United States and in Central America, is that
street education is extremely important. 30 ' This means teaching kids
wherever they might be: in markets, under bridges, and in parks and
streets. They must be taught about health issues such as AIDS and
also must be given practical skills such as literacy and numeracy.
300. For additional information about the following programs and the countries in
which they are located, see Appendices B and C, infra.
301. In a telephone interview, Marilyn Rocky, Regional Director of Childhope-USA,
emphasized that programs were changing their focus from institutionalizing street
children to working with them in their own environment. The institutionalization model,
Rocky argued, has two fundamental flaws. The first is that it takes care of children until
they reach a certain age but then lets them go completely. Because these children have
never learned to deal with their own environment, it is unclear whether they will be able
to do so as adults. Second, institutionalization is incapable of handling the swelling
number of street children. Telephone interview with Marilyn Rocky (June 21, 1994).
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Vocational training is also important. °2 Former street child Carlos
Palacios suggested that children be invited to participate in workshops
that teach easily learnable skills that give quick feedback, such as
carpentry, electricity, music and ceramics.30 3
Programs to help children rejoin their families should also be
designed. This requires counseling before the children and the family
reunite, and it also requires advice concerning programs available to
families to help reduce the stress of poverty. Casa Alianza's Family
Reintegration Program3° 4 is an excellent example of such a program,
but more efforts along these lines are needed.
Finally, more drug treatment programs are needed. At present,
there is only one free drug treatment program in Guatemala, that of
Casa Alianza. It would be valuable to have a drug crisis center located
in Guatemala City where children could get counseling without having
to commit to full treatment. Since many are not ready or willing to
make the commitment to a full-time program like Casa Alianza's
Nuhuyu, a walk-in clinic would be an effective intermediate step.
The programs described in the following sections might be
considered as models for Guatemala.
1. Center for the Defense of the Child (CDM)
The CDM is located in Bel6m, a Brazilian city of about 1.5
million people.30 5 Its staff of professionals offers children social,
psychological and legal support.30 6 What is most noteworthy about
the CDM is its stress on building self-esteem.30 7
The CDM has developed a variety of ways to improve self-
esteem. One technique is to have children answer questions like, "Who
am I?" and "What makes me an individual, different from everyone
else, unique and a valuable part of society?"0 8 The CDM has also
designed an array of activities. For example, staff members make a
302. Street Children, supra note 1, at 88 (testimony of Marilyn Rocky, Regional
Director, Childhope-USA).
303. Id. at 60 (statement of Carlos Palacios, former street child and employee of
Childhope).
304. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
305. Tom Scanlon et al., Working with Street Children, 3 Development in Practice,
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collage of photographs of different people. Then they ask the children
to pick out those they like most and least and explain why. The goal
is to build a sense of self through negative and positive identification
with others.
3 0 9
The philosophy behind the program makes sense. If the
children think of themselves as worthless, then they are unlikely to
change, either by keeping clean or by leaving the streets altogether.
The CDM stresses self-esteem as an important building block to
change and self-growth, and it would be wise for other programs to
take this seriously.
2. Neutral Ground
Neutral Ground is a twenty-four-hour center in Kansas City,
Kansas that seeks to reunite runaway youths between the ages of ten
and seventeen with their families. 1 ° As soon as a child arrives, she
is assigned a primary counselor who will follow her case to the end.
The counselor tries first to find out why the child ran away. If the
problem is not sexual or physical abuse, then within twenty-four hours
the counselor contacts the parents. She explains the program at
Neutral Ground, assures the parent that the child is safe, discusses the
expectations of the program, gives a brief description of the major
problems the child is having, and then seeks the permission of the
parent for the child to stay and the commitment of the parent to work
with Neutral Ground.311
At this point, counseling begins. If a reconciliation is made,
then the child goes home. She will be visited at least five times in the
course of the next year to see how she is doing. If no reconciliation is
made and the child does not want to return home, then Neutral
Ground begins investigating other possible living arrangements.31 2
3. The Bridge
The Bridge offers two major kinds of outreach to the children
309. Id.
310. Street Kids--Homeless and Runaway Youth: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 101-822 (1990) (statement of Clarence Small, Director
of Emergency Services for Wyandotte House, Inc., a comprehensive youth organization).
311. Id.
312. Id.
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of Boston, Massachusetts: streetwork and a medical van.313 Outreach
workers go out twice a day to locations where street children hang out.
They let the children know about Bridge programs in addition to
referring them to counselors who can talk to them about their
problems. 14 The organization has specialized counselors for drug
abuse. 15 It also has a medical van that drives around offering free
medical care. The kids can have a sandwich and a cup of cocoa if they
want, and there is always someone who will listen.
3 16
The strength of the Bridge is that it supports the child while
he is leaving the street, instead of making support conditional on
having left the street. Not all children have the willpower to leave the
temptations of the street for a more stable environment. The Bridge
recognizes this and is willing to help children in their chosen
environment instead of first making them move to a new environment
that the children view as potentially dangerous. 31 ' This willingness
to work with children where they feel most comfortable is particularly
important for children who have a hard time establishing trust.
4. Boscofiia/La Florida
Boscofiia/La Florida in Bogota, Colombia is a project that has
achieved remarkable success in helping street children.31 ' It succeeds
for three major reasons. First, it allows children to take responsibility
for other children. Second, like Casa Alianza, it lets children progress
at their own pace through different steps from being non- to fully-
residential. Finally, it teaches the children skills that will help them
get jobs when they leave Boscofiia. Designed by a Catholic priest,
Father James de Nicolo, Boscofiia/La Florida works through five
steps.
31 9
The first step is recruiting children. Older children, who are
one step higher in the process, go out to areas frequented by street






318. Development: What Works: Hearing Before the International Task Forces of the
House Select Comm. on Hunger, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 101-04. (1989) (statement of
Deborah Szekely, President, Inter-American Foundation).
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children and offer them warm drinks or some other treat. Their goal
is only to make friends and offer the children someone to talk with if
they so desire. Recruiters also invite the children to a place where they
can bathe, clean their wounds, wash their clothes, eat a light meal,
and play. The facilities are kept sparse so that the children do not
become dependent. While the street children eat breakfast, the older
children tell them about the benefits of making it through the process
to the last step, which they describe as a beautiful campus called La
Florida. The children who are most interested in making it through the
process are invited to spend the night in a simple dormitory. The
purpose of this stage is to introduce the child to the program and to
encourage him to change without removing him completely from his
normal life.320
If the children are interested, then they can go to step two. At
step two, the children receive some basic education, essentially just to
identify how much they know, and then do basic chores. They can
leave at any time, but if they leave before a month is over, they cannot
come back for six months.3 2'
Once they have been at step two for a month, they move to step
three, where they go to school. There are two volunteer nurse
superintendents, and the new participants are taught by older children
in the program. The children in the program stay until they learn to
read and write, which takes anywhere from one to four years.322
Step four is a sort of junior high school where the children
learn geography and history. Here, there is a garden where they grow
enough vegetables for the other facilities."s
The final step is a vocational school called La Florida, where
the children learn a variety of practical skills, including welding,
construction, and automobile repair. The children make money doing
this work; the money helps support the rest of the Boscoftia system.
The children are paid in special Boscoffia currency that is printed by
the Bank of Colombia. Although they cannot use it, they deposit it in
the Boscofiia bank and exchange it for real money when they leave.
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B. Reducing Abuses Against Street Children
The United States can play an instrumental role in reducing
the number of abuses against street children. To begin, American
policy-makers should state openly to the Guatemalan government and
to the international community that they are concerned about the
number of abuses against street children. 2' They should then create
a fact-finding commission that will go to Guatemala to find out who is
responsible for the abuses against street children and why the abuses
occur. To accomplish this task, members of the commission should talk
with many people, including international human rights experts,
representatives of Guatemalan human rights groups and children's
advocacy groups, the Catholic Church, and the Guatemalan
government and military. The commission should try to get abuse
statistics from more than one source. Once policy makers have
determined who is committing the violations against street children,
they should respond accordingly.
1. Private Security Forces
Private security forces have been accused of hurting street
children. 26 Because a general sentiment exists in Guatemala that
the police are corrupt or incompetent, 27 many people take personal
responsibility for defending their homes or businesses. They hire
armed guards who are members of the police, army, or private security
organizations.328  These individuals are extremely difficult to
prosecute.
Getting the evidence for a crime committed by a member of a
private security organization is difficult. Many private police services
are not registered, which makes it difficult to find the responsible
325. It is important that this statement be public for several reasons. First, such a
public statement will acknowledge and support the work that local human rights groups
are doing to help street children. Such acknowledgment is important to protect members
of these groups from reprisals by abusers of street children. Second, speaking publicly
will put pressure on the Guatemalan government to lower the number of abuses against
street children. Finally, Guatemala will be put on notice that if it does not take actions
to lower the number of abuses, the United States may take actions against it.
326. See Casa Alianza, 1992 Annual Report, supra note ", at 2-4, 10; Casa Alianza,
1991 Annual Report, supra note **, at 4-7.
327. See supra notes 226-44 and accompanying text.
328. Interview with Bruce Harris, supra note 161.
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party.129 Furthermore, many services simply transfer the guard who
committed the crime. After the murder of the street child Francisco
Chacon Torres by a private security guard, the head of the security
firm transferred the killer.3 °
When the guard is a member of the police or the military, he
might as well be unregistered. Neither the government nor the
business that hired the guard wants to take responsibility for the
guard's actions. On July 13, 1993, the Minister of Defense told Bruce
Harris, the Director of Casa Alianza, that he would no longer allow
members of the Guatemalan police or armed forces to serve as private
security guards.3 1
If the commission finds that private security forces are
responsible for abuses against street children, then the U.S.
government should urge the Guatemalan government to prosecute
these individuals to the full extent of the law. If the commission
discovers that members of the police or army are committing these
abuses as paid security guards, then the U.S. government should
pressure Guatemala to live up to its promise to Bruce Harris.
2. The Police or Army
There have been many documented attacks by members of the
police or army against street children. The question that must be
asked, however, is whether these attacks are by individual members
of the police or army who acting on their own initiative, or whether the
attacks are actually being encouraged by high officials in the police or
army.
a. How the U.S. Should Respond If the Attacks
Are Made by Individual Policemen and
Soldiers, but They Are Not Being Encouraged
by Those in Control
If the attacks are made by individuals, then U.S. policy-makers
should state openly that the U.S. considers the rights of street children
worth protecting and that it is the responsibility of the army and the
329. Id.
330. Interview with Casa Alianza Legal Aid Office staff, in Guatemala City,
Guatemala (June 8, 1993).
331. Id. See also Interview with Bruce Harris, supra note 161.
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police to make sure that abuses, particularly by members of their own
organizations, do not occur. Policy-makers should stress that state
security forces should train the police and troops so that they do not
commit abuses. If the Guatemalan police and military do not take the
above-stated measures, Congress should decrease, and eventually cut,
funding aimed at the Guatemalan police and military.
332
At present, U.S. funding of the Guatemalan military has been
severely reduced due to human rights violations.333 This reduction is
an appropriate sanction. It is important, however, that funding not be
resumed until human rights violations against street children are
reduced.
b. How the U.S. Should Respond If the Police and
Army Are Actively Encouraging Violations
Clearly, it is extremely serious if the upper echelon of the
Guatemalan security forces are encouraging abuses against street
children. If this is the case, U.S. policy-makers should state publicly
that they are disturbed by the open disregard for the rights of street
children by the Guatemalan security forces, and for this reason, they
will cut aid to the police and/or military (depending on who is
encouraging the abuses) until it becomes evident that the official policy
is no longer to hurt street children but instead to protect them.'
3. Immunity
Regardless of who is committing the violations, at present it is
unlikely that they will be prosecuted and then sentenced for their
crimes. To ensure that violators actually suffer the consequences of
332. If the U.S. does decide to cut military and police aid, it should follow through
on its decision completely. In the past, the U.S. has suspended military aid but continued
to have military operations in Guatemala. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at
13 (statement of Frank R. LaRue, Director, Center for Human Rights Legal Action).
333. Telephone interview with Anne Manuel, Americas Watch (Nov. 20, 1995). See
also Appendix D.
334. Cutting aid to the military because of human rights abuses is not a new idea.
See Options, supra note 187, at 77 (statement of Frank R. LaRue, Senior Fellow,
Commission on U.S. Latin American Relations, former labor leader in Guatemala, and
Director, Center for Human Rights Legal Action); id. at 49 (statement of Anne Manuel,
Human Rights Watch/Americas). On July 24, 1990, the U.S. government cut military aid
to Guatemala due to excessive human rights abuses. Id. at 131-35 (Appendix 2, H. R.
Con. Res. 355).
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their actions, U.S. policy-makers should state publicly that they are
concerned by the lack of convictions of those who violate the human
rights of children. In addition, they should take a number of the
following actions.
a. Consulting an Expert for Investigations
Guatemala should be encouraged to invite an independent
expert to observe and to participate in its investigatory procedures for
several reasons. First, it is possible that the Guatemalan police are not
qualified to conduct a thorough investigation. 5 If that is the case,
then the Guatemalan police and prosecutor could learn a great deal
from working with an expert in investigatory procedures. This
knowledge would be helpful both in the particular case and in the
future. In addition, in his capacity as observer, the expert could report
to both the Guatemalan and the international community whether the
investigation was thorough and fair. Such reports could help to restore
the credibility of the investigations in Guatemala.3 36
b. Observing Trials
Making sure that independent observers witness trials of
alleged abusers of street children would make the procedure more fair.
Judges, lawyers, witnesses, and police officers knowing that they are
being observed, would be more likely to follow the law. Furthermore,
an observer could make a public statement concerning the proceedings
of the trial. She could state whether she thinks the proceedings were
fair or unjust.
If public attention and scrutiny are ineffective in making trials
more fair, U.S. policy-makers should decide whether there is anything
else they should do, either to help make the Guatemalan judicial
system work better or to penalize the system for working badly.
335. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
336. For a detailed discussion of this policy suggestion see Options, supra note 187,
at 21-22 (statement of Philip Benjamin Heymann, head of the Center for Criminal
Justice, Harvard Law School).
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c. Changing Legal Representation Rules
One change that would make it more likely for abusers of
street children to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law would be
to change the legal representation rules. Article 14 of the Codigo de
Menores (Code of Laws Governing Minors) states that only a child's
legal guardian can be his or her legal representative. 3 7 If a minor
has no legal guardian, then the state takes over this role. This means
that no private lawyer or legal aid office, like that of Casa Alianza, can
take the child's case.338
Since the Public Ministry has neither the manpower nor the
will to represent everyone who needs it, 339 children will not get the
same level of attention they would receive from private organizations.
Instead, the law should be changed to allow private individuals or
organizations to represent children if the child's family requests it.
Alternatively, a judge should be given the discretion to decide if it
would be in the best interest of the child to be represented by the
organization.
d. Changing the Witness Rules
Another reform that would make it easier to prosecute those
who violate the rights of street children would be to change the witness
rules. Article 435 of the Guatemalan Constitution forbids anyone under
the age of sixteen from being a witness in court.34 Since most crimes
against street children happen at night when few people are around,
it is hard to find witnesses who will testify. Either they are adults who
do not want to get involved, or they are children who, because of their
age, do not have a legal voice. This law creates a huge barrier against
the successful prosecution of abusers.
Instead, the law should be changed to allow children of any age
to offer testimony in court. Although the finder of fact should
determine whether the child is telling the truth, age should not
prevent a child from testifying.
337. Interview with Marvin Rabanales, supra note 274.
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
340. Interview with Marvin Rabanales, supra note 274.
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C. Stopping Children from Becoming Street Children
Ending the phenomenon of street children in Guatemala is a
daunting task. Since street children are a manifestation of glaring
societal problems in Guatemala, it would be a mistake for the U.S. to
think that money and political pressure are all that is required.
Helping Guatemala to grapple with these problems will take much
patience and political courage. American politicians must know which
kinds of reform are reasonable to ask the Guatemalan government to
make, and which are not.
In addition, Americans must be willing to exert some political
pressure to get these reforms enacted. Such pressure might be in the
form of public statements emphasizing the importance of these reforms
to the Guatemalan government and to the international community.
Alternatively, the State Department could discuss the progress of these
reforms in an annual report.
If none of these measures worked, the U.S. could pressure the
Guatemalan government in less traditional ways, such as by
restricting travel for pleasure to the U.S. At present, many people who
fly back and forth to Guatemala are in the upper classes. Since these
same individuals may also be the political, economic and military
leaders in Guatemala, they may respond if something they care about,
like travel, is threatened
Finally, if none of this is successful, the U.S. could consider
reducing aid to Guatemala. According to Section 701 of the
International Financial Institutions Act, the U.S. should consider
human rights relevant in determining whether to grant loans to
Guatemala through the International Development Bank, the World
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.3"
The Guatemalan government should be encouraged to enact the
following reforms. The reforms I suggest are rather low cost, yet they
are likely to have immediate effects on the lives of street children.
1. Educational Reform
Although illiteracy stems, for the most part, from the fact that
many families cannot afford to send their children to school instead of
having them work, for those who do go to school, educational
341. See Guatemala Prospects, supra note 180, at 57 (statement of Frank R. LaRue,
Director, Center for Human Rights Legal Action).
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opportunities are often bleak. It is not uncommon to see all the
children in a village crammed into two classrooms, with almost no
separation for age or ability. 2 Larger and better equipped schools
are necessary, especially in rural areas.
In addition, the school day needs to be designed to fit the needs
of students. Children who work in the fields with their parents are less
likely to attend school if it meets during the morning rather than
during the late afternoon or evening. Similarly, urban schools must be
specially designed to meet the needs of working street children.
UNICEF, Childhope, and the National Commission for Action for
Children have designed a program in Guatemala that is geared
specifically toward street children, offering a more flexible schedule
and skills workshops. 3
Since low skill level is part of the reason children end up on
the street (i.e., low skills = low paying jobs = poverty = increased
chance of family disintegration), it is important that children are
better educated, so that they will be better equipped as adults to earn
a decent living. This requires not just teaching traditional academic
subjects but also offering occupational workshops.'"
2. Daycare
Daycare facilities would also help in preventing children from
going to the streets. Since many parents are forced due to economic
hardship to work long hours, daycare would give the children a place
to go instead of being left at home alone. In particular, if the daycare
centers could provide a hot meal and some educational activities, the
children would not be induced to go out into the streets in search of
food or entertainment. 5
3. New Drug Laws
In addition, serious consideration must be devoted to legal
342. When I went to Nebaj to visit Casa Alianza's homes there in the summer of
1993, I stopped by a local school. I was told by Casa Alianza staff that the extreme
overcrowding I witnessed there was common.
343. Street Children, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Per Engebak, American
Representative, UNICEF).
344. The UNICEF Project described above stressed occupational workshops and
income generating activities. Id.
345. See Agnelli, supra note 4, at 90.
1995]
114 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol.27:57
changes for drug addicts. Casa Alianza has been on the forefront of
this thinking. In the past, addicts were sent to jail.346 Now the
Guatemalan government may send them to drug rehabilitation
programs.3"7
In addition, pressure should be put on glue-manufacturing
companies to produce a product that is less intoxicating. The
Minnesota-based company H.B. Fuller has known for a long time that
thousands of children throughout Central America are addicted to its
glue Resistol, but it has done little to alleviate this situation.m
Finally, after extensive pressure, Fuller announced in the summer of
1992 that it would stop the sale and production of its adhesive
products where evidence existed that they were being abused. In
response, Fuller received corporate citizenship awards and laudatory
newspaper editorials."49
Despite this announcement, Fuller withdrew its products only
from Guatemalan and Honduran distributorships but continued to sell
to industrial users in these countries. It hoped that various
distribution controls would stop secondary sales to children. According
to Guatemalan Congressman Raphael Barrios, Fuller failed to affect
abuse of Resistol by children. He stated that street children are still
sniffing Resistol and it is available everywhere. 50
Many of those who criticize Fuller advocate not withdrawal
from the market but instead using an additive that would make
346. Interview with Marvin Rabanales, supra note 274.
347. Id.
348. In addition, the Coalition on Resistoleros, a group which criticizes Fuller's sale
of Resistol, claims that it bought in Costa Rica paint manufactured by Fuller that
contained lead levels 50 times higher then what would be allowed in the U.S. See Susan
E. Peterson, H.B. Fuller Bids Goodbye to Patriarch, Star Tribune, Apr. 22, 1994, at 14;
see also Diana B. Henriques, Black Market for a 'Good Citizen": Critics Say Fuller Isn't
Doing Enough to Curb Glue-Sniffing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1995, at F1, Fl 1.
349. See Minnesota Company Continues Glue Sales in Latin America (National
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 22, 1994) [hereinafter National Public Radio] (transcript
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library); Kids' Glue-sniffing Raises Accountability Questions;
Critics Demand U.S. Firm Stop Producing Solvent-based Substances in Latin America,
Dallas Morning News, June 13, 1993, at 73-74; Peterson, supra note 348, at 14.
350. See National Public Radio, supra note 349; see Susan E. Peterson, Segment of
Tonight's 'Dateline NBC' Has More Bad News on Glue Made by the H.B. Fuller Co., TV
Show: Resistol Still Being Abused by Latin American Kids, Star Tribune, Sept. 28, 1993,
at D1.
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inhalation uncomfortable.3 51 Following this philosophy, the Casa
Alianza Legal Aid Office proposed a new drug law in 1992 that
mandates that factories add mustard seed oil to glue and paint
thinner. The mustard will induce vomiting and make inhalation
extremely uncomfortable.352
Although such a law could radically affect the use of inhalants
by street children, it is insufficient. Children sniff glue because they
are cold, hungry, and unhappy. 53 Unless their real needs are
addressed, children will fill their emptiness with something else, be it
paint thinner, gasoline, or other substances.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the situation of street children in Guatemala is bleak,
it is not without hope. National and international attention is starting
to focus on resolving the problem, and the situation is improving.
Attacks against street children have decreased and programs are now
available for those who want to leave the street.
Yet policy-makers must stop and consider what they strive to
achieve. If the goal is to get this generation of children off the street,
then policy-makers need only to increase the amount of aid given to
youth in crisis programs and diversify the programs available. If policy
makers want to break the cycle of despair for future generations,
however, they have a much more challenging task. Lasting change
requires deep structural reform of Guatemalan society as a whole.
351. This is the approach that the Tester company of Illinois took. When Tester
learned that many children were getting high from its airplane glue, it added mustard
seed oil, which curbed inhalation by making it extremely uncomfortable. See National
Public Radio, supra note 349, at 67.
352. Interview with Marvin Rabanales, supra note 274. For more information about
the law, see Analizardn Ley de Protecci6n al Menor, Prensa Libre, July 10, 1993.
353. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT GUATEMALA35
I. Poverty
1. 94.4% of unemployed Guatemalans live in extreme
poverty (1989 statistics).
2. 66.8% of employed Guatemalans live in extreme
poverty (1989 statistics).
3. 60% of the population lives in rural areas, and of these,
83% do not have enough money to pay for basic necessities
(1990 statistics).
4. 80% of the entire population is living in poverty.
5. Poverty increased from 63% in 1980 to 77% in 1989.
II. Health
1. Health programs cover 14% of the population (1992
statistics).
2. 33.5% of the population suffers from malnutrition, of
these, 57.8% has chronic malnutrition (1987 statistics).
3. 37% of children between the ages of five and nine
suffer from malnutrition.
4. Infant mortality is at 6%.35
5. Child mortality for those five and under was 102 per
1000 live births in 1989. The principal causes of death were
diarrhea, respiratory infections, and malnutrition.
6. 15,000 cases of cholera were reported in 1992.
III. Housing
1. 50% of the population lacks minimal quarters.
2. 62% of the population has only dirt floors.
3. More than 50% of families have only one room for the
entire family.
4. 63% of the population does not have latrines.
354. Unless otherwise noted, statistics are from Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, supra note 52.
355. United Nations Development Programme, supra note 63, at table 28 (Health
and Nutrition), at 292.
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IV. Land
1. 2.1% of farm owners have 72% of the farmland and
earn 90% of the farm credit.
2. 548,000 small farm owners have an average of 2.6
acres.
3. Every year, Guatemala loses 153,000 hectares of forest.
V. Education
1. Spending on education was 1.8% of GDP (1985
statistics, with recent estimates showing no significant
change).
2. Illiteracy for individuals aged fifteen and older is 45%
(1990 statistics).
3. 63 of every 100 children who began school in 1978 had
dropped out by 1984.
4. In rural areas, 49% of girls enroll in school and most
drop out.
VI. Unemployment
Unemployment rose from 31.2% in 1980 to 41% in 1990.
VII. Child Labor
1,600,000 children are working to support themselves and their
families.
VIII. War
1. There are 150,000 orphans.
2. There are 50,000 widows.
IX. Social Spending
In 1990, spending on social assistance and welfare programs
equaled U.S. $2 million, or .4% of the budget. This comes out
to less than one quetzal per child per year.
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
Name of City & General Strengths of Potential for
Program Country of Information Programs Use in
Origin re: Street Guatemala
Children
Casa Guatemala 1. 5000 in 1. Street Effective
Alianza City, Guatemala educators. advocate &
Guatemala City.3 6  2. Specialized supporter of
2. Glue programs for street
commonly drug addicts children for
used. & young over 10
3. Abuse by mothers. years.
state forces 3. Legal aid
and private office.
citizens.
Center for Beldm, 1. 200,000 1. Stress on Very feasible.
the Defense Brazil estimated in self-esteem.
of the Child Brazil.3
7
(CDM) 2. 4611 killed
between
1988-1990.m'
Neutral Kansas 1. 1-1.3 1. Stress on 1. Lack of
Ground City, KS, million reunification phones would
U.S.A. runaways per with family. make contact
year 2. Use of between






356. Street Children, supra note 1, at 53-54.
357. Dead End Kids, Newsweek, May 25, 1992, at 16.
358. This number is based on Brazilian federal police reports. Amnesty
International, Report: Brazil: Extrajudicial Execution of Street Children in Sergipe 2
(July 1992).
359. National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, Runaway and Homeless
Fact Sheet 1 (n.d.).
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The Bridge Boston, See above. 1. Outreach 1. Cost an
MA, U.S.A. workers. issue, but





Gamines BogotA, Estimates 1. Children Very feasible.
Project Colombia range from given
5000 total in responsibility
Colombia" °  in
to 12,000 in maintaining
BogotA the program.




360. Gary Barker et al., Attitudes and Knowledge of AIDS and Sexually
Transmitted Diseases among Street Youth in Bogota Colombia: Findings from Recent
Focus Group Discussions 3 (n.d.) (Childhope-USA Working Paper No. 5) (quoting
UNICEF (1990)).
361. Id. (quoting J. Harrison, Muchachos de la Calle (Gamines): Special Focus: Drug
Addiction (1987)).
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON OF QUALITY OF LIFE
362. Population. "M' symbolizes "million." United Nations Development Programme,
supra note 63, table 26 (Population Growth and Projections), at 288-89.
363. Id.
364. Id. table 1, at 238-39.
365. Id. table 28, at 292-93.
366. Id. table 30, at 296-97.
367. Id. table 31, at 298-99.
Country Pop.3  Avg. Life Malnu- % Share Urbani-
Ann. Expec- trition of zation.3671
Pop. tancy Under Income . % of
Growth at Age or Tot. Pop.








Guate- 9.5 M 2.9% 64 34% 1.2.1% 1. 40%
mala 2. 63.3% 2. 35%
Brazil 9 M 1.4% 66 13% 1.2.1% 1. 76%
2. 67.5% 2. 3.3%
(1989)
USA 253 M .9% 76 11% 1.4.7% 1.75%
2. 41.9% 2. 1.1%
(1985)
Colom- 33 M 1.5% 69 12% 1.4.0% 1. 71%
bia 2. 53% 2. 2.9%
(1988)
1995] STREET CHILDREN IN GUATEMALA CITY
APPENDIX D
U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND
APPROVED WEAPONS SALES TO GUATEMALA
368
Security 1994 1995 1996
Assistance3 6 9
Economic Support $300,000 $2 million 0 requested
Fund (ESF)3 70  (estimated)
International $36,000 $2 million $250,000




International $2 million $2.5 million $2.55 million
Narcotics Control requested
(INC)373
Weapons Sales3 74  1994 1995 1996
Commercial Arms Sales NA $1.5 million $796,000
requested
[ Foreign Military Sales 0 0 o375
368. Unless otherwise noted, all of the information for this table comes from U.S.
Dep't of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1995
(1995).
369. Id. at 405.
370. ESF is considered security assistance because it is cash and, therefore,
fungible. Telephone interview with Anne Manuel, Human Rights Watch/Americas (Nov.
20, 1995).
371. Id.
372. Even though, technically, IMET is still suspended, the money is available
pending progress on human rights cases. Id.
373. This funding goes to the Treasury Police, and other organizations. Id.
374. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 368, at 489.
375. $8 million was recorded in State Department statistics, but, according to Anne
Manuel, this is a mistake. Manuel had spoken with a State Department staff member
who said the true amount of approved sales was zero. Telephone interview with Anne
Manuel, supra note 370.
